Intercircuit Conflicts in the Courts of Appeals by Wasby, Stephen L.
Montana Law Review
Volume 63
Issue 1 Winter 2002 Article 4
1-2002
Intercircuit Conflicts in the Courts of Appeals
Stephen L. Wasby
Professor of Political Science Emeritus, University at Albany - SUNY
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Montana Law
Review by an authorized editor of The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law.
Recommended Citation
Stephen L. Wasby, Intercircuit Conflicts in the Courts of Appeals, 63 Mont. L. Rev. (2002).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol63/iss1/4
ARTICLE
INTERCIRCUIT CONFLICTS IN THE
COURTS OF APPEALS*
Stephen L. Wasby**
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................... 120
II. BACKGROUND .......................................................................... 127
III. CONFLICT CLAIMS AS RHETORIC ............................................ 133
A. Conflicts and Sitting En Banc ....................................... 137
B. Circuit Conflict and the Supreme Court ...................... 140
IV. MENTION AND DISCUSSION IN PUBLISHED OPINIONS ............ 141
A. Noncontentious Citation ................................................ 141
B. Going Along and the Norm of Avoidance ...................... 144
C. Responses to Claimed and Actual Conflict ................... 147
1. Distinguishing of Cases ...................................... 149
2. Acknowledging the Conflict ............................... 151
3. Resolved Conflicts ............................................... 154
4. Choosing Sides in a Conflict .............................. 158
* An earlier version of this article was presented to the Midwest Political Science
Association, Chicago, Illinois, April 27 2000. The comments of Arthur Hellman have
been especially helpful. Thanks also to Sara Benesh, Tracey George, Malia Reddick, and
Reggie Sheehan. I also wish to acknowledge the substantial assistance of Richard Irving,
Law Librarian at the Dewey Graduate Library, University at Albany, in the search for
data.
** B.A., Antioch College; M.A., Ph.D., University of Oregon. Professor of Political
Science Emeritus, University at Albany - SUNY. E-mail address:
wasb@cnsunix.albany.edu
1
Wasby: Intercircuit Conflicts in the Courts of Appeals
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2002
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
5. Creating a Conflict ........................................... 160
D. Responses to Dissenters' Claims .................................. 164
1. Absence of Response ........................................... 165
2. Types of Response ............................................... 170
V. DISCUSSION DURING DECISION-MAKING ................................ 175
A. Within the Panel: Before Disposition ........................... 175
B. After the Opinion is Filed .............................................. 179
1. Some Individual Cases ....................................... 180
2. M odes of Reacting ............................................... 187
3. Using Other Circuits' Work ............................... 192
VI. CONCLUDING COMMENTS ....................................................... 193
PART I. INTRODUCTION
Each U.S. court of appeals draws to some extent upon other
circuits' cases. Unlike the Supreme Court with its almost
entirely discretionary jurisdiction, the courts of appeals have
mandatory jurisdiction and thus must decide all the cases before
them. Any circuit court of appeals can at times defer a decision
until another court, particularly the Supreme Court, has decided
the issue before it. However, in the courts of appeals, with the
parties' urging the judges are likely to look laterally at the
actions of the other courts of appeals which have faced the same
or similar issues.
The most routine use of other circuits' cases is to support
various, often non-central points. Beyond that, however, judges
of any one court of appeals note whether other circuits' cases
join and support, or diverge from and are in conflict with, the
law of their own circuit. References to intercircuit conflicts are
found in majority opinions, as when judges say why their court's
position is preferable to that of some other circuits; in dissents
from the panel opinion, when a judge says the majority is
creating an intercircuit conflict; and in dissents from denial of
en banc reconsideration of a case, when similar arguments are
made. This activity -particularly how courts of appeals respond
to the possibility that their actions will create intercircuit
conflicts, including their attempts to limit intercircuit conflict
before cases are taken to the Supreme Court- has received
little scholarly attention.'
1. The major exception is Arthur D. Hellman, Precedent, Predictability, and
Federal Appellate Structure, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 1029 (1999). That article reports a study
commissioned by the Federal Judicial Center (FJC), after Congress, in the Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990, asked the FJC to study 'the extent and effect of unresolved
Vol. 63
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soon as they first appear, it is suggested that some courts of
appeals have shifted position, thus eliminating the intercircuit
conflict. However, this has never led to systematic treatment of
how the courts of appeals in fact dealt with incipient or actual
intercircuit conflicts, so that we remain with a virtual absence of
work on the topic.
To help repair that omission, this article presents an
examination of how courts of appeals deal with those conflicts as
they decide cases that may produce a conflict or may reinforce a
side in a pre-existing conflict. The purpose here is not to perform
a statistical analysis of the frequency with which the issue of
intercircuit agreement or divergence takes place or of the
proportion of certain types of responses. Instead, it is a look at
intercircuit conflict through the eyes of court of appeals judges,
with the focus on process. Court of appeals judges' treatment of
real or claimed intercircuit conflicts is illustrated by examples.
In looking at those cases, we limit our attention to those aspects
of the case implicating intercircuit conflict. Our interest is not
in the details of the doctrinal analysis in which the judges
engage in their published opinions but in the types of discussion
they have about the questions before them.3 Here one must
remember that there are cases in which intercircuit conflict is
the Supreme Court's focus when it grants review, but in the
court of appeals, there was no discussion of real or possible
conflict. This may have been because the conflict had not yet
developed or because some interpretations of the point at issue
had not yet been put on the table.
I do not take issue here with the assumption, implicit in
most discussion of intercircuit conflicts, that all intercircuit
conflicts should be eliminated or at least kept to a bare
minimum. For present purposes, I take that debatable
assumption as a given, because it is an important part of the
background against which judges deal with the issue, and
because most of their discussion seems to be based on its
implicit acceptance. 4 Nevertheless, one must keep in mind that
the assumption is debatable. One might argue, for example, that
differing interpretations of a legal point should be allowed to
"percolate" before the Supreme Court intervenes to eliminate
3. The reader may examine those cases which are cited to obtain a better feel for
the relative importance of the intercircuit conflict issue within the case.
4. See, e.g., United States v. Gwaltney, 790 F.2d 1378, 1388 n.4 (9th Cir. 1986)
("Unnecessary conflicts among the circuits are to be avoided."). The question, of course, is
what constitutes an "unnecessary" conflict.
Vol. 63122
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This article provides an exploration of federal appellate
judges' treatment of the case law of other circuits in connection
with actual and claimed intercircuit conflicts. As such, it is a
departure from the attention usually given to intercircuit
conflicts from the perspective of the U.S. Supreme Court, which
keeps tabs on intercircuit conflicts as lawyers claim they
develop. In that line of scholarship, there are several principal
questions examined. One is when, on the basis of its Rule 10(a)
that intercircuit conflict will be a consideration in granting
certiorari, the Court does grant review to those conflicts and
when it does not, as well as the reasons why it does so. Another,
related question is whether the court deals sufficiently with
such conflict or whether more capacity to announce national law
is needed.2
Despite the many studies of this genre, comparable
attention has not been given to how lower courts have treated
intercircuit conflict. In these studies, in connection with mention
of the notion that conflicts should be allowed to "percolate," that
is, that the Supreme Court should not try to resolve them as
conflicts between federal judicial circuits." Id. at 1036. While Hellman examines
instances where one court of appeals does not draw on potentially dispositive out-of-
circuit cases, the present article provides instances in which judges have used such
cases. Hellman deals only with cases containing dissents, while the present article draws
on any cases, whether or not the panel is internally divided. The two articles also use
somewhat different perspectives in discussing use of cases from another circuit: Hellman
focuses on whether uncertainty within other circuits would be reduced by making
binding the ruling of the first court to deal with a question, while the present article
provides instances where that has happened on a de facto basis.
2. Major work on intercircuit conflicts and the extent to which the Supreme Court
resolves them includes: SAMUEL ESTREICHER & JOHN E. SEXTON, REDEFINING THE
SUPREME COURT'S ROLE: A THEORY OF MANAGING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL PROCESS
(1988); Estreicher and Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court's
Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 NEW YORK U. L. REV. 681 (1984); New York
University Supreme Court Project, 59 NEW YORK U. L. REV. 823 (1984).
Important related works are H.W. PERRY, DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA
SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1991), and DORIS M. PROVINE, CASE
SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1980).
Of particular importance is the more recent work Arthur D. Hellman, By
Precedent Unbound: The Nature and Extent of Unresolved Intercircuit Conflicts, 56
U.PITT. L. REV. 693 (1995), and Arthur D. Hellman, Light on a Darkling Plain:
Intercircuit Conflicts in the Perspective of Time and Experience, 1998 SUPREME COURT
REVIEW 247. A professor at University of Pittsburgh School of Law, Hellman was deputy
director of the Commission of Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System (the
Hruska Commission) in the early 1970s and then chief of staff attorneys for the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. His frequent work on the subject made him the
logical candidate for the Federal Judicial Center-sponsored study noted above. See
Hellman, supra note 1. Much of Hellman's work is related to the proposal to divide the
Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., Arthur D. Hellman, Dividing the Ninth Circuit: An Idea Whose
Time Has Not Yet Come, 57 MONT. L. REV. 261 (1996).
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the conflict.
Court of appeals judges' consideration of other circuits' cases
and of claims of intercircuit conflict does not take place in
separate, discrete steps in the decision of a case. Rather it occurs
at a number of loci in the decision-making process as part and
parcel of a seamless web of judicial decision-making. The initial
and most basic place for consideration of possible intercircuit
conflict is the three-judge panels which decide the vast majority
of cases in the U.S. court of appeals. In discussing the case
before them after receiving briefs and hearing argument, the
members of the panel will examine and discuss cases from
outside the circuit, particularly in the absence of circuit
precedent on point. Not only must they deal with pre-existing
intercircuit conflict, but they may also face claims, by lawyers or
their panel colleagues, that to adopt a particular position would
be to create an intercircuit conflict.
Once the panel issues its disposition, a claim of an
intercircuit conflict may be raised either by lawyers petitioning
for rehearing or rehearing en banc, or by judges outside the
panel ("off-panel judges") who are stimulated by party initiative
or act independent of it to monitor their colleagues' work. Those
judges may "stop the clock" to ask the panel to reconsider its
position. Or, if the panel will not amend its opinion in a manner
acceptable to the off-panel judge, that judge may ask the court
to rehear the case en banc to adopt a position that would not
cause an intercircuit conflict.5
Data for this paper are drawn from two sources. One is
published opinions of the U.S. courts of appeals from the 1990s,
including dissents from denials of rehearing en banc.6 The other
5. Intercircuit conflicts are also debated within en banc courts, a matter outside
the scope of this article.
6. To supplement the author's files, a WESTLAW scan using the command TE
(CIRCUIT /5 CONFLICT!) & DA(AFT 1989), that is, "circuit" within five words of
'conflict," was performed for Ninth Circuit cases from 1990 through late 1999 to capture
as many mentions of intercircuit conflict as possible, even if unusable cases also
appeared. The scan produced headnotes and text embodying a reference to conflict for
329 cases; both published opinions from the Federal Reporter and so-called "not-for-
publication" memorandum dispositions, which WESTLAW posts for the Ninth Circuit,
were included. Because "conflict" also appears in reference to intracircuit conflict and
other inter-court conflict, between the Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court or between
federal and state court rulings, as well as in such concepts as "conflicting testimony" and
'conflict of interest," of the 329 cases mentioning "conflict," only 135 cases involved
references of any sort to intercircuit conflict.
The opinions in the 135 "good hits" were then examined to determine the
context of the specific language about intercircuit conflict and to see if discussion of other
circuits' rulings appeared elsewhere in the opinion. This step is a necessary step because
2002
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is case files. The latter are important because published
opinions do not tell us about the process by which the judges
have considered claims of intercircuit conflicts or even whether
judges have discussed such conflicts when no judge chooses to
mention them in the court's disposition. The casefiles do record
the judges' discussion as they decide cases and agree on the
disposition they will issue.
The judges of the Ninth Circuit have their chambers at
dispersed locations throughout the circuit in addition to circuit
headquarters at San Francisco. They are scattered from Seattle,
Portland, and Boise in the north, to Phoenix, San Diego, and Los
Angeles in the south, and to Fairbanks, Alaska, and Honolulu
outside the contiguous forty-eight states. Most communication
among the judges is neither face-to-face nor spoken on the
telephone. This is the case for several reasons. One is that the
judges are aiming toward a written product. They also use
written communication because of their geographic dispersion;
because panels of the court rotate, so that judges who sit
together one month likely sit with other colleagues the next; and
because some sit (are "on calendar") while others are in their
chambers working on opinions. The judges communicate with
each other about cases primarily by means of the court's
internal e-mail system, with memoranda and draft opinions
printed out in the recipient's chambers. There they become a
hardcopy record of judges' communication with each other. In
the appropriate case file, they join in-chambers memoranda
between clerks and judge and an occasional notation about a
telephone call.7
only one judge -likely to be the dissenter- may write explicitly of an "intercircuit
conflict" but the other judges may have discussed the same cases without referring to
"conflict." This suggests that the search, while over inclusive as noted, may also have
been under inclusive to the extent that the judges, without ever using the "magic words"
of "circuit conflict," discussed other circuits' doctrine that differed from the Ninth
Circuit's position. Herman v. Tidewater Pac. Inc., 160 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 1998), provides
an example. It was a "hit" because of the mention of "conflicts" with respect to a
subsidiary issue but did not "hit" on the panel's far more extensive discussion of the
case's chief issue, on which the circuits had taken diverse positions but with respect to
which the word "conflict" does not appear in the text of the opinion. Under-inclusiveness
is not a serious problem here, as the present study does not undertake to calculate the
proportion of cases in which the intercircuit conflict issue is raised, but instead deals
with how conflict is handled when it is raised.
7. For detail on communication among Ninth Circuit judges, both before and after
installation of the e-mail system, see Stephen L. Wasby, Communication Within the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals: The View from the Bench, 8 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 1
(1977); Stephen L. Wasby, Communication in the Ninth Circuit: A Concern for
Collegiality, 11 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 73 (1987); Stephen L. Wasby, Technology and
124 Vol. 63
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The files used in this study are those of one Ninth Circuit
judge, from closed cases in the mid-1980s through the mid-
1990s. Basing a study on the files of only one judge does mean
that there are many Ninth Circuit cases for which published
opinions are available but information about the preceding
within-panel discussion is not. Nonetheless, material in a single
judge's files is quite likely to be reasonably representative of
communication within a court of appeals. The reason is that in
due course any judge sits with all other judges of the court. As a
result, any one judge's files contain communications to and from
many colleagues, including those not on panels with the judge
but who have communicated in their role as off-panel monitors.
The case files are fairly complete for most cases,8 although
occasionally context makes clear that some memos have not
reached the file. The files contain communications among the
three members of a panel considering a case;9 communications
with off-panel judges who have commented on, and requested
changes in, the panel's disposition; and communication within
the entire court in relation to requests to rehear cases en banc.10
Like any internal court communication, the materials in
these files are confidential, and the author was allowed access to
them on that basis. When published opinions are discussed, they
will, of course, be cited as per normal practice. However, because
the material drawn from the case files is confidential, it will for
the most part be presented without mention of the name of the
judge whose memorandum is being quoted and often without
mention of the name of the case. Materials presented in this
article without attribution or citation are drawn from these
Communication in a Federal Court: The Ninth Circuit, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (1988);
and Stephen L. Washy, Technology in Appellate Courts: Electronic Mail in the Ninth
Circuit, 73 JUDICATURE 90 (1989).
8. There may be variations from one chambers to another in the types of
documents retained. It is also possible that a judge willing to grant access to files in
closed cases to someone not on the court's staff, even if fairly knowledgeable about the
courts, might leave more rather than less material in those files. The author's
impression from discussions with judges is that they are too busy with the press of
everyday business to have time to sort through case files selectively to create a favorable
'paper trail." Few have a systematic "deaccession policy" for documents.
9. As with the Supreme Court, there is no transcript of the judges' post-argument
deliberation of a case. There is a "conference memo" prepared by the presiding judge,
summarizing the judges' positions to a greater or lesser extent and memorializing the
writing assignment.
10. The latter material is particularly complete in these particular files because, as
the court's en banc coordinator, the judge oversaw activity after a panel had issued its
disposition even when not participating in the within-panel discussion (if any) with
respect to intercircuit conflict.
2002 125
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confidential materials, and as a result, the reader should not be
looking for the types of citations that would appear as a matter
of course in the usual law review article engaging in doctrinal
analysis.
After this introduction, Part II provides some background
on the intercircuit conflict issue. Part III contains discussion of
whether judges' mention of intercircuit conflict is a rhetorical
device. Some attention is also given there to the role of
intercircuit conflict in holding en banc courts and to the relation
between court of appeals' treatment of conflicts and the
Supreme Court. Parts IV and V constitute the principal part of
the article. Part IV is a discussion of the judges' use in their
opinions of cases from other circuits, with a particular focus on
treatment of intercircuit conflict, and their responses to
dissenters' claims of such conflict. In Part V, we turn to see how
questions of intercircuit conflict are handled during the decision-
making process leading to an opinion. The article concludes with
a brief summary and with a suggestion for further needed
research.
Most discussion of intercircuit conflict begins with the
mention of the conflicts in the judges' opinions. That warrants
using public mention as our starting point before we move on to
the previously-unexamined process by which the judges grapple
with claimed intercircuit conflict. Separation of pre-opinion
activity from the ultimate formal disposition also makes some
sense because matters discussed within the panel may not be
visible in the ultimately filed opinion; this is likely if disputes
over other circuits' rulings are resolved there. That may occur
when a judge who complained about an intercircuit conflict
chooses not to file a separate writing, as a result of having
obtained some modification of the majority opinion, from a
feeling that publication may call more attention to the case than
is warranted, or from a lack of passion to proceed. An off-panel
judge's claim of intercircuit conflict in a "stop clock" memo or en
banc call may likewise not result in a published dissent from a
denial of rehearing en banc. Here we must remember that
judicial opinions are not reports of the exchanges or bargaining
that took place before the opinion was put into final form, so
that judges do not report discussion of possible or actual
intercircuit conflicts. 1
11. For example, a Fourth Circuit case that figured prominently in a Ninth Circuit
panel's internal discussion received no mention in the opinion in the case. See United
126 Vol. 63
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policy-making does not mean that, from the perspective of court
of appeals judges, such conflicts are not an important matter.
We can begin to obtain some sense of the importance of the
matter at that level of the court system if we put aside an
implicit assumption that resolution of those conflicts is possible
only when they arrive at the Supreme Court's docket. To the
extent that court of appeals judges do pay attention to
intercircuit conflict, they may reduce it by preventing it from
developing or by eliminating it in its infancy. If instead of
attending to the Supreme Court's treatment of conflicts, we look
at how they are treated in the courts of appeals' published
opinions and during the intra-court discussion that leads up to
those opinions, what becomes clear is that court of appeals
judges are sensitive to conflicts and do pay considerable
attention to what their colleagues in other circuits are doing
when the same issues face more than one court.
Attention to intercircuit conflicts only after they arrive at
the Supreme Court, and the lack of attention to the process by
which the court of appeals themselves deal with intercircuit
conflict, may result from the related implicit and inaccurate
assumptions of "circuit independence" and "mutual ignorance."
These notions are that, in developing the rulings which are in
conflict, each court of appeals acts with full independence of all
the others, and that court of appeals judges lack awareness of
other circuits' rulings which conflict with their own decisions.
Indeed, the portrayal by advocates of the need for additional
capacity to deal with the "flood" of intercircuit conflicts almost
seems to be depicting the courts of appeals as manufacturing
such conflicts without heed to other circuits.
The picture presented here is quite different. While not all
court of appeals judges address claims of intercircuit conflicts in
great depth, and sometimes do not address them at all, "the
name of the game" seems to be conscious consideration of the
possibility of such conflicts, coupled with an effort to avoid them.
In short, appellate judges take seriously the charge to reduce or
minimize such conflicts before they reach the Supreme Court.
We find that judges express concern for maintaining national
uniformity in the law17 and -as will be discussed more fully-
17. See, e.g., Judge Kleinfeld's statement that "on this matter of national tax policy
there is something to be said for uniformity among the circuits," so that the claimant's
argument was not "so strong as to justify a conflict" between the Ninth Circuit and
another court. King v. United States, 152 F.3d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir. 1998). In another
case, he stated that "Because of the importance of predictability to commercial relations,
2002
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take seriously the norm that they should not casually create
intercircuit conflicts. Their paying heed to other circuits'
decisions is part of their participation in a coherent institution, 18
and it allows us to speak of the courts of appeals, sometimes
thought of as "regional", as part of a coherent national system. 19
Indeed, many of the times that the Supreme Court has taken a
case to resolve an intercircuit conflict, that conflict has already
been discussed below. 20 In short, cases from circuits which are in
conflict or at least in tension with each other do not simply float
up, each independent of the others, to the Supreme Court.
To be sure, there are instances when two courts of appeals
are unaware of a conflict between their decisions because the
lawyers did not call the conflict to the court's attention or
because vagaries of timing "hid" one case from the other court.
Additionally, there can be instances where two U.S. courts of
appeals come up with the same result, or end up in conflict,
without explicitly drawing on each other.21 Hellman suggests
that where "the disagreement involves a narrow issue that does
as well as deference to our sister circuits, we shall not lightly create an intercircuit
conflict affecting commerce nationally." Portland 76 Auto/Truck Plaza Inc. v. Union Oil
Co. of California, 153 F.3d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 1998).
18. "Because judges identify strongly as members of an institution.... they
respond to the views of other judges not because it was strategically useful for them to do
so in terms of their own policy preferences but because they were professionally
committed to the notion of coordinated institutional doctrine." Anne Bloom, The Post
Attitudinal Moment: Judicial Policymaking Through the Lens of New Institutionalism,
35 LAw & Soc REV. 219, 226-227 (2001).
19. There is some evidence that state courts, although not part of a single "system"
as are the U.S. courts of appeals, likewise pay attention to each others' rulings in much
the same way. See Carey Goldberg, Massachusetts Case Is Latest to Ask Court to Decide
Fate of Frozen Embryos, N.Y. TIMES, November 5, 1999, at A20 ("But legal experts say a
consensus of sorts has been emerging, though it is nonbinding and has come out of the
state courts, which watch each other's decisions as they make their own.").
20. Arthur Hellman, Never the Same River Twice: The Empirics and Epistemology
of Intercircuit Conflicts 31 (April 2000) (paper presented to Midwest Political Science
Association) (on file with author) ("Most often, the acknowledgment of conflict will be
found in the court of appeals decision that is brought for review."). In noting intercircuit
conflict, the Supreme Court acknowledges that this has taken place. See discussion
infra.
21. The latter may have been the situation with the two cases-a Sixth Circuit
case and a Ninth Circuit case-on in rem civil forfeiture that the Supreme Court
reviewed together. U.S. v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996) (decided together with United
States v. $405,089.23). The Supreme Court majority said the two lower courts had the
'same view." At least in the material the Supreme Court quoted there was no explicit
reliance by one court on the other. Of particular note is the finding that in roughly one-
third of the cases Hellman examined in his Federal Judicial Center study of intercircuit
conflicts, "neither the majority nor the dissent cited any out-of-circuit precedents on the
issue that gave rise to disagreement within the panel." Hellman, supra note 1, at 1057.
10
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panel to reconsider its disposition, or seeking to have the court
rehear a case en banc. At those times, although an intercircuit
conflict may be the central or determinative issue or may even
be the only issue before the court, in order to reinforce their
position they often include other elements with the intercircuit
conflict claim. These elements include whether the court has
developed an intracircuit conflict, 34 which only an en banc court
may eliminate just as only an en banc court may overrule past
circuit precedent, and whether there is a conflict with the
Supreme Court. And a third is the creation of intercircuit
conflict.
One can see the combination of some of these elements in a
dissent from the court's denial of en banc rehearing. There the
dissenting judges complained that the panel's ruling
"contradicts the plain language of the [statute], conflicts with a
prior decision of this circuit, and creates a needless intercircuit
conflict with all courts of appeals that have addressed the
issue."35 In another case, a dissenting judge complained not only
about the intercircuit conflict he alleged the majority was
creating, but also said the court's decision also contravened a
Supreme Court decision and created a conflict within the
circuit.36 Not only may claims of intercircuit conflict be
entangled with other elements, but they may also be related, for
example, when an intercircuit conflict is said to be mirrored by
intracircuit divisions.37
The mixture of intra- and inter-circuit conflict claims is
illustrated in two cases in which the panel itself called sua
sponte for en banc hearing before issuing its ruling. In the
Shabani drug conspiracy case,38 briefs and oral argument had
convinced the panel "that Ninth Circuit opinions are in
conflict."39 Although not the basis for the panel's en banc call,
34. See, inter alia, Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and Jurisprudence: The Theory
and Practice of Precedent in a Large Appellate Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 541 (1989),
Arthur D. Hellman, Breaking the Banc: The Common-Law Process in the Large Appellate
Circuit, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 915 (1991); Stephen L. Washy, Inconsistency in the U.S. Courts
of Appeals: Dimensions and Mechanisms for Resolution, 32 VAND. L. REV. 1343 (1979).
35. Northwest Envtl. Advocates v. City of Portland, 74 F.3d 945, 948 (9th Cir.
1996) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
36. Indian Oasis-Baboquivari Unified Sch. Dist. No. 40 v. Kirk, 91 F.3d 1240, 1245
(9th Cir. 1996) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
37. See In re Yochum, 89 F.3d 661, 666 (9th Cir. 1996) ("This intra-circuit conflict
mirrors the circuit split.")
38. United States v. Shabani, 993 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1993), rev'd, 513 U.S. 10
(1994).
39. Unattributed quotations are taken from internal court communications to
Vol. 63
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make it less necessary for judges to monitor other circuits'
rulings on a continuous basis.32
In addition to what members of a panel learn from the
attorneys in a case, their clerks, and their own reading, their
colleagues also call to their attention real or possible conflicts
that they have missed. This is most likely after the panel has
filed its disposition, with an "off-panel" colleague making an
internal request for reconsideration or a call for rehearing en
banc, and often the panel will modify its opinion somewhat to
take into account their colleague's concerns. However, a panel is
able to alter its opinion more easily if it has not yet issued its
mandate. 33
PART III. CONFLICT CLAIMS AS RHETORIC
Are conflicts "real" or are claims of conflict only used for
rhetorical effect? Judges of varying ideological positions may
agree on the presence of intercircuit conflicts in some cases. Yet,
the use made of claims that conflict is present, particularly
where other judges say it does not, leads to the suspicion that
such claims are also rhetorical devices. After examining that
topic, in this section, we move on to look at the relation between
claims of intercircuit conflict and whether a court of appeals
should sit en banc, and then briefly at how intercircuit conflicts
implicate the court of appeals' relation with the Supreme Court.
Judges claiming that their colleagues' actions will create an
intercircuit conflict almost invariably argue against such a
conflict as they claim to seek intercircuit uniformity. Judges do
so most often while dissenting, "stopping the clock" to get the
32. Knowledge of other courts of appeals' views also results from judges sitting in
those courts. In such situations, visiting judges learn primarily about new procedures
for handling cases. However, they also bring some of their own circuits' law with them.
One judge talks about having "insinuated" himself into the law of another court by using
'some liberal ideas from the Ninth Circuit." When the court on which he was sitting
relied on its own old circuit precedent, he concurred separately to argue that the case
was wrongly decided. The court of appeals then sat en banc to correct the law.
Interview with Judge Alfred T. Goodwin, 9tb Cir. Court of Appeals, in Sisters, Ore.
(October 10 1999). See also Morstein v. Nat. Insurance Services, Inc., 74 F.3d 1135 (11th
Cir. 1996) (panel decision, Goodwin J., concurring), rev'd en banc; 93 F.3d 715 (11th Cir.
1996).
33. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Long v. SCS Business & Technical Institute,173
F.3d 890, 891 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (supplemental opinion) ("In the same week that our
opinion issued, the Fifth Circuit held that the Eleventh Amendment bars a False Claims
Act qui tam suit in federal court .... Since our sister circuit implicitly challenged our
jurisdiction. . and our mandate has not issued,., we think it appropriate to... explain
why we believe we should stick with the order of decision we adopted.").
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intercircuit conflict was also implicated, both because the Ninth
Circuit cases cited to a Fifth Circuit ruling, which in turn was
based on the conflicting doctrine from that circuit, and because,
as the panel noted, "This circuit stands alone in its
interpretation" of the relevant statute. Then in the Butros v.
INS case,40 when the panel had sought en banc hearing because
of an intracircuit conflict, a judge who had sat on the allegedly
conflicting case wrote to distinguish it, but in so doing,
introduced mention of an existing intercircuit conflict.
In the debate over "en-bancing" some cases, conflict with
Supreme Court precedent has been added to the combination of
intracircuit and intercircuit conflict. In a labor election case,41 a
judge stopped the clock "because the opinion is arguably in
conflict with Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent"; here
too intercircuit matters were also implicated because an earlier
Ninth Circuit ruling the present panel used drew on a Fifth
Circuit case. Although in a later memo, the "calling" judge made
clear that his "major concern is to keep Ninth Circuit law
intact," he added the claim of intercircuit conflict. In another
case, concerning the law of search and seizure, this judge again
combined claims, saying "the decision conflicts with Supreme
Court precedent and with our own. It also needlessly creates an
intercircuit conflict."
The likelihood that a dispute over an intercircuit conflict
will be mixed with other issues is particularly true for a
mandatory jurisdiction court. A certiorari court could limit its
consideration to the issue causing the intercircuit conflict.
However, there is an expectation that a mandatory jurisdiction
court, although it can apply canons of judicial restraint to avoid
reaching some issues presented, is expected to reach most of
them. If the issue containing the conflict is important, judges
may have no way out but to decide what stance to take on the
intercircuit conflict and to decide as well what weight to give
that issue relative to other major factors.
When a judge combines all these elements, it may be
another way of saying, "This is a really bad decision." Such
combining of claims thus gives rise to the question of whether
intercircuit conflicts are "real" or are (simply) used as a
which the author was allowed access. They are used without citation to the case or to
the judge making the statement.
40. 990 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir.1993) (en banc).
41. Am. W. Airlines v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 969 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1992), amended
by, 986 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1992).
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rhetorical device to gain an advantage for the position being
advocated, as is done in certiorari petitions to get the Supreme
Court's attention. The claimant may believe that a conflict
actually exists or there may be a colorable argument that there
is indeed a conflict in rulings. However, exaggeration is likely,
with opposing parties left to debunk the claim by showing that
cited cases are inapposite or by distinguishing them. At times
the claim seems to be little more than a mask for dislike of the
result the majority has reached, made not to protect the
principle of uniformity in national law, but because one judge
does not prefer the proposed result. The many calls for rehearing
en banc made by judges known to be at one end of the ideological
spectrum or the other gives further credence to the notion that
those calls are something of a cover for result orientation.
Because a judge who piles claim on claim may create a
stronger position than if the claim were limited to only one
element, it is not unusual to find that a dissenting judge
complaining about his majority colleagues, or an off-panel judge
complaining about a panel, will combine a complaint about an
intercircuit conflict with complaints about other sins committed
by the majority. We see this in Judge Kozinski's dissent to the
Gaudin en banc's holding that materiality is an element of the
offense of making a false statement in a matter within a
government agency's jurisdiction. He called the majority's
opinion a "tsunami":
It's not every day, after all, that we provoke a conflict with
every other regional circuit, defy Supreme Court authority,
implicitly overrule several lines of our own case law-thereby
creating a spider web of secondary circuit conflicts- and pave
the way for successful habeas petitions for scores, perhaps
hundreds, of prisoners convicted of a broad range of federal
crimes. 42
At times, litanies like these make it appear that a judge
may be throwing mud at the wall in the hopes that some will
stick - claiming intercircuit conflict, intracircuit conflict, and
conflict with the Supreme Court, as well as crimes against man
and nature-and they reinforce the notion that claims of
intercircuit conflict are used as a rhetorical device.
The question of whether intercircuit conflict claims are
42. United States v. Gaudin, 28 F.3d 943, 954 (9th Cir. 1994) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting). Despite the hyperbole, the Supreme Court, which not infrequently listens to
Judge Kozinski, affirmed. 515 U.S. 506 (1995).
136 Vol. 63
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Judge) was said to have been like Chief Justice Burger in
wanting a rule that the court must go en banc if there was to be
an intercircuit conflict. While the court declined to adopt such a
rule-perhaps because if a case were going to go to the Supreme
Court, the en banc process would add another year-the court
did have a rule that a panel creating an intercircuit conflict
should notify the court to that effect. 46 Under this regime, in a
case where a government petition for rehearing alleged an
intercircuit conflict, Judge Wallace wrote to his colleagues, "Our
General Orders indicate that if the suggestion contains as one of
its grounds the allegation that the opinion initiates a conflict
with another court of appeals, the panel is to advise us," and
therefore "[it is incumbent upon the panel to advise the court of
this alleged conflict."47
The Ninth Circuit has since added procedures by which
attorneys in the court's Case Management Unit monitor certain
types of cases and notify the entire court about them; among
those cases are those in which the panel expressly disagrees
with another circuit. This procedure, a result of the work of the
court's Evaluation Committee, makes it unnecessary for a panel
to advise colleagues of the conflict, but Judge Wallace's point is
met.
48
It is also interesting to note what happened when the
Supreme Court, in reversing a Ninth Circuit decision, noted
that, although not the basis of the reversal, an intercircuit
46. For the practice in another circuit, see this note in a Fifth Circuit case: "In
accordance with Court policy, this opinion, being one which initiates a conflict with the
rule declared in another circuit, was circulated before release to the entire Court, and
rehearing en banc was voted by a majority of the non-recused judges in active service...
"Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 196 F.3d 514, 516 n.* (5th Cir. 1999).
47. Memorandum from Judge J. Clifford Wallace, to all 9th Circuit judges
(December 17, 1991) (on file with author) (regarding, Soler v. Scott, 942 F.2d 597 (9th
Cir. 1991), vacated, Sivley v. Soler, 506 U.S. 969 (1992)). In another case, there was a
contretemps over the meaning of the rule. Judge Wallace stopped the clock so a panel
which had consciously created a circuit conflict could comply with the provisions of the
General Orders by informing the court of the circuit split. Another judge then pointed
out that the rule did not apply because the relevant party "has never alleged that there
is an inter-circuit conflict," not even in response to an order requesting the parties' views
on whether the case should be heard en banc. The panel opinion's author also pointed
out that the panel had already commented on why it had rejected the cases from two
circuits(As the amended opinion read, "This holding puts this circuit in conflict with two
other circuits.") Those responses led Judge Wallace to withdraw his "stop clock." (In
this and other instances without citation to a case or identification of judges, material is
taken from case files made available to the author.).
48. See David R. Thompson, The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Evaluation
Committee, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 365 (2000).
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(mere) rhetoric or something more bears on the dispute among
political scientists studying the judiciary as to whether (only)
attitudes and ideology explain judges' voting, or whether law
counts for something in that explanation. To the extent that a
judge with known ideological proclivities engages in serious
examination of a range of options from other courts, and
explains why the position he or she adopts is ultimately to be
preferred, one might say that the legal notion of "avoiding
intercircuit conflict" in fact does mean something independent of
ideology. However, if judges of easily identifiable ideological
persuasion repeatedly claim "intercircuit conflict" in a way that
would seem to be a cover for seeking particular results, attitude
may be said to trump the "legal" explanation.
A. Conflicts and Sitting En Banc.
Independent of whether or not judges' claims concerning
intercircuit conflict are rhetorical tools used to achieve a sought-
after policy result, such claims affect decision-making within a
court of appeals because the presence of an intercircuit conflict
may affect the decision as to whether the court should rehear a
case en banc. The Ninth Circuit's present formal position is that
an intercircuit conflict regarding a rule of national application is
a basis for the court's taking a case en banc.43 Indeed, in a
recent case, a judge even used the possibility of one to argue that
the court should go en banc." Likewise, nonexistence of an
intercircuit conflict can be proffered as reason for not hearing a
case en banc. In a rare concurrence from a rejection of
suggestion to rehear en banc, Judge Kleinfeld observed for
himself and two other judges that factors which "probably
explain the court's decision not to rehear the case en banc"
included the facts that "[t]he court's decision was compelled by
well established precedent. There is no inter- or intra-circuit
conflict."45
There are judges who believe strongly that the presence of a
(claimed) intercircuit conflict is reason for an en banc hearing.
Indeed, Judge J. Clifford Wallace (later the Ninth Circuit's Chief
43. 9th Cir. R. 35-1.
44. Espinoza-Gutierrez v. Smith, 109 F.3d 551, 557 (9th Cir. 1997) (on denial of
rehearing) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("A direct conflict with another circuit doesn't yet
exist, but one may be on the horizon.").
45. Monterey Mech. Co. v. Wilson, 138 F.3d 1270, 1272 (9th Cir. 1998) (on denying
rehearing en banc) (Kleinfeld, J., concurring). This case also illustrates the interplay of
intercircuit conflict with other elements.
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PART II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we examine some background concerning
intercircuit conflicts, including whether they are a "problem"
and how courts of appeals avoid them. A principal reason why
the Supreme Court is the focus of almost all discussion about
intercircuit conflicts is that the presence of an intercircuit
conflict is one criterion used by the Supreme Court in
considering whether to grant review. Indeed, along with "the
importance of the issue," resolution of an intercircuit conflict is
the reason stated most frequently for granting certiorari. 12
Another reason for this focus is that starting in the 1970s, policy
debate about the federal court system centered on whether the
national court system had sufficient capacity to resolve
intercircuit conflicts. In particular, the question posed was
whether the Supreme Court adequately performed that task or
whether, as recommended by the Freund Study Group and by
the Commission on Revision of the Federal Appellate System
(the Hruska Commission), the perceived need for greater
capacity to settle unresolved conflicts required a National Court
of Appeals or comparable judicial body to assist the High
Court.
1 3
Neither the National Court of Appeals or any proposed
variant was enacted, and the idea is no longer on the front
burner. The retirement of Justice Byron White from the United
States Supreme Court removed the "resident nag" who, in
dissents from denials of certiorari, regularly reminded his
colleagues of the intercircuit conflict cases the Court had refused
to review. 14 Moreover, the recent substantial decrease in the
Supreme Court's plenary docket has undercut the argument
that the system lacks sufficient present capacity to resolve such
conflicts. Important studies, particularly by Arthur Hellman,
also demonstrated that the seriousness of the purported effect of
intercircuit conflicts on national "primary actors" conducting
States v. Schram, 9 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 1992).
12. See the studies discussed and cited at STEPHEN L. WASBY, THE SUPREME
COURT IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 215 (4th ed. 1993).
13. Commission on Revision of Federal Court Appellate System, Structure and
Internal Procedures 29-31 (1975).
14. His statements were noted by the lower courts. See, e.g., United States v.
Cannon, 29 F.3d 472, 475 (9th Cir. 1994) ("circuit courts now conflict on the proper
standard for evaluating 'pretextual stop' claims." Citing Cummings v. United States, 112
S.Ct. 428 (1991) (White, J., dissenting)).
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their activities in more than one circuit, was exaggerated. 15 One
might expect lawyers attempting to get the Supreme Court's
attention to emphasize intercircuit conflicts. However, these
studies showed that not all such putative conflicts are clear and
direct, as many are only "sideswipes" (that is, partial or oblique
conflicts rather than direct ones) and many others can be
eliminated by distinguishing cases. Moreover, conflicts allowed
to "percolate" may resolve themselves as some circuits fall in
line with other circuits and new statutes or regulations resolve
other intercircuit disagreements.
In considering the dimensions of the "problem," we must
also remember that not all issues are equally likely to result in
different interpretations that vary from one circuit to the next.
The issue must be one that recurs in several circuits. Examples
are federal criminal and civil procedure, which are national in
scope, and some areas of regulatory policy such as labor-
management relations. Even where an issue is recurring across
the circuits, in the Ninth Circuit, "no pattern is discernible in
terms of the issue areas."16  If, however, an issue arises
exclusively or predominantly in one circuit, then the possibility
of intercircuit conflict is reduced. For example, many of the
Indian fishing rights cases arise in the Ninth Circuit; they also
turn on treaties specific to a single tribe. In the 1970s, cases on
border searches without warrants occurred primarily in the
Ninth Circuit and to a lesser extent in the Fifth Circuit, the two
circuits with extensive borders with Mexico. Another example is
cases in admiralty, which occur in a larger but still limited
number of circuits. When jurisdictional statutes place most
appeals in one court, as is true for the District of Columbia
Circuit hearing cases regarding environmental regulations, by
definition there can be no intercircuit conflict. And
interpretations of state law under federal diversity-of-citizenship
jurisdiction are often specific to a single circuit, although not
invariably so.
That the "problem" of unresolved intercircuit conflicts is
presently considered of diminished importance for national
15. See,e.g., Arthur D. Hellman, Caseload, Conflicts, and Decisional Capacity: Does
the Supreme Court Need Help?, 67 JUDICATURE 28 (1983); Arthur D. Hellman, The
Proposed Intercircuit Tribunal: Do We Need It? Will It Work?, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q.
375 (1984).
16. Stefanie A. Lindquist, The Judiciary as Organized Anarchy: Inter-Circuit
Conflicts in the Federal Appellate Courts 12-13 (April 2000) (paper presented to Midwest
Political Science Association) (on file with author).
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not control the merits of the appeal,. . . the judges might not
think it worthwhile to seek out guidance from out-of-circuit case
law."22  However, instead of assuming that this "mutual
ignorance" occurs regularly, our working assumption should be
that judges are usually made aware of at least other circuits'
published opinions. Indeed, at times, judges are aware of cases
even prior to their being decided; they may know, for example,
that another court of appeals has heard argument in a case 23 or
that it has decided to take a case en banc.24
The courts of appeals are provided with information and
also monitor each other so that each court is aware of other
courts' relevant rulings. Supporting evidence for this claim is
that the Supreme Court from time to time has noted that one
circuit was aware of other circuits' rulings, and may even have
taken them into account. 25 In its 1971 ruling in Rosenberg v. Yee
Chien Woo, the Court noted that the Second Circuit, having
"dealt at length with the Ninth Circuit opinion in this case," had
"expressly declined to follow the Ninth Circuit interpretation of
the statute."26 And, in Aldinger v. Howard, an instance where
the lower court maintained an intercircuit conflict, Justice
Rehnquist commented that the Ninth Circuit, the source of the
case being reviewed, had said that it "was not unaware of the
widespread rejection of its position in almost all other Federal
Circuits ."27
Still another notation of one court being aware of the
contrary ruling by another court came in United States v.
Hughes Properties, Inc., where Justice Blackmun pointed to the
Claims Court's having noted conflict with a court of appeals:
22. Hellman, supra note 1, at 1063.
23. See, e.g., Granzeier v. Middleton, 173 F.3d 568, 574 n.2 (6th Cir. 1999) (On
December 1, 1998, the Fourth Circuit heard oral arguments in the appeal of Koenick v.
Felton,973 F.Supp. 522 (D.Md.1997) (holding that a state statute creating a public-school
holiday from the Friday before Easter through the Monday after Easter does not violate
the Establishment Clause.)).
24. For an instance in which the judges noted that the en banc might serve to
eliminate the intercircuit conflict, see Chandler v. United States Army, 125 F.3d 1296,
1302 (9th Cir. 1997)("It may be that the intercircuit conflict will be obviated, because the
Sixth Circuit is reconsidering a recent application of Murdock [the conflicting case] en
banc.").
25. To determine whether the Supreme Court grants review to resolve the conflicts
which the courts of appeals have discussed, one would have to trace cases from a court of
appeals in which intercircuit conflict was discussed to determine if the Supreme Court
accepted those cases and, if it did so, how it treated and perhaps resolved the conflict, a
task not undertaken in this article.
26. 402 U.S. 49, 52, n.2 (1971).
27. 427 U.S. 1, 3 (1976).
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The Claims Court further acknowledged that its ruling was
in conflict with the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in Nightingale v. United States,28 having to do with
another Nevada casino, but it declined to follow that precedent
and specifically disavowed its reasoning.2 9
While the Supreme Court does speak of the courts of
appeals' treatment of intercircuit conflicts, we have to keep in
mind Hellman's observation that "[w]hether the Court refers to
a conflict - or gives any reason for hearing the case - may depend
on how the opinion is written and which Justice writes it." He
notes that Justice Scalia "almost never explains why the Court
granted review," and "[iif he does allude to intercircuit conflict,
he almost invariably does so in the course of making an
argument on the merits."30
Lawyers, also well aware of intercircuit conflicts as they
develop, bring them to the court's attention by using them while
arguing on their clients' behalf. And if judges considering a case
were not aware of another court's actions before issuing their
own ruling, a party's petition for rehearing will make them
aware. It is certainly possible, however, that the lawyers will not
catch such cases. Hellman notes that lawyers may have "framed
their arguments so single-mindedly around the law of the circuit
that they declined to research decisions of other circuits or
refrained from citing them even if they were closely on point." If
the judges "confined their analysis to the cases cited by the
parties," other circuits' work would not be addressed. 31
At least at the initial stages of the appellate process the
judges largely depend on lawyers to bring to their attention
relevant cases from other circuits, and to note possible or real
conflicts. Yet, case searches by law clerks may reduce that
dependence. A law clerk's search for "on point" cases often
provides additional or more-up-to-date citations. Even if
lawyers' citations were up-to-date when briefs were filed,
intercircuit conflicts may have been created subsequently, prior
to argument or decision in the case. While lawyers do file
supplemental letter briefs citing such cases, clerks' Insta-cite
searches to retrieve information during consideration of a case
not only bring the relevant cases to the judges' attention but also
28. 684 F.2d 611 (1982).
29. 476 U.S. 593, 598-599 (1986).
30. Hellman, supra note 20, at 80.
31. Hellman, supra note 1, at 1058.
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conflict between the Ninth Circuit and another court of appeals
was implicated in the case. On the basis of this comment, on
remand the Ninth Circuit sat en banc for further consideration
of the case.49
One aspect of the intercircuit conflict - en banc relationship
is that an en banc ruling as part of an intercircuit conflict
situation would make the issue even more visible to the
Supreme Court.50 There are judges who argue that, if the
Supreme Court is going to decide an issue regardless of whether
the lower court has sat en banc, resources should not be
expended on an en banc sitting. Likewise, judges may argue
that if an intercircuit conflict already exists, there is little need
for the court of appeals to consider the issue en banc because the
existence of the intercircuit conflict per se increases the
likelihood the Supreme Court will decide the issue.51
It may also be the case that if the court of appeals chooses
not to give en banc treatment to a case, the Supreme Court may
have to take the case to clarify the law. In what amounted to a
plea to the Supreme Court to take the case, Judge Stephen
Reinhardt argued in his dissent from the Ninth Circuit's denial
of en banc rehearing in United States v. Koon, that "the Supreme
Court may yet provide Judge Davies with the guidance that our
own court has refused to offer.., perhaps the Supreme Court
will deem it important to clarify the extent of the authority that
sentencing judges possess to depart downwardly from the
[Sentencing] Guidelines. "52
49. The case is United States v. Jose, 519 U.S. 54, 56 (1996) (per curiam) ("We
express no opinion on the merits of the underlying dispute. The matter, indeed, is one
that implicates an intercircuit conflict." Id. at 56.) On remand, Judge Hall, after noting
this language, wrote, "In light of this intercircuit conflict, we decided sua sponte to
consider the merits of this case en banc." United States v. Jose, 131 F.3d 1325, 1327 (9th
Cir. 1997)(en banc). And, on the merits, the Ninth Circuit decided to agree with the
ruling of the court of appeals with which it had earlier disagreed: "Upon reconsideration,
we agree with the Fifth Circuit's reasoning and holding," thus overruling earlier Ninth
Circuit cases that had relied on earlier (and later overruled) Fifth Circuit decisions. Id.
at 1329.
50. H.W. PERRY, DECIDING TO DECIDE, supra note 2, is the leading treatment of
the justices' consideration of factors used in granting certiorari. It fails to discuss
whether en banc rulings provide a "signal" used by the Supreme Court, so the discussion
here is speculative. A recent study finds that the granting of certiorari is definitely
related to the court of appeals having sat en banc. Tracey E. George and Michael E.
Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of the United States Courts of Appeals En Banc, 9
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 171, 196-197 (2001).
51. For further discussion of reasons why the court of appeals would or would not
sit en banc, see George and Solimine, supra note 50, passim.
52. United States v. Koon, 45 F.3d 1302, 1308 (9th Cir. 1995) (Reinhardt, J.,
2002
21
Wasby: Intercircuit Conflicts in the Courts of Appeals
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2002
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
B. Circuit Conflict and the Supreme Court.
How judges deal with intercircuit conflict is also linked to
the court of appeals' relation to the Supreme Court. The
importance of intercircuit conflict as a criterion for the Supreme
Court's selection of cases has often been noted. If a court of
appeals creates an intercircuit conflict, the Supreme Court is
more likely to grant certiorari in the case. The fact that lower
court judges wish to avoid having their rulings reviewed may
serve as a pragmatic brake on creating intercircuit conflict. This
is over and above the norm that, in the interest of nationally
uniform law, such conflicts should not be created. Even if the
pressure of being the court to create a conflict is removed when
an intercircuit conflict already exists, by "weighing in" on the
issue and lining up on one side of the conflict or the other, the
court may increase the likelihood that the justices will perceive
that the conflict is of sufficient importance to warrant granting
certiorari. However, one must also keep in mind that there are
judges like the one who says he "always took the view that we
should not hesitate to create splits if we thoughtfully and
carefully concluded that [another] Circuit was wrong," doing so
to "hold the Supreme Court's toes to the fire," to force the
justices to deal with an issue.5 3
In any event, when the justices decide a case regarding an
issue on which the circuits disagree, what the Supreme Court
meant becomes part of the intercircuit dispute, and intercircuit
conflict may turn on interpretations of the justices' statements.
This was the case when Ninth Circuit judges deciding Catholic
Soc. Servs. v. Thornburgh5 4 tried to determine which view from
the D.C. Circuit to adopt in interpreting McNary v. Haitian
Refugee Center,55  and when Ninth Circuit Judge Harry
dissenting). The Supreme Court did grant review, affirming the Ninth Circuit in part,
reversing in part and remanding. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
53. With the Supreme Court's relatively light docket, he observed, "I was never
convinced . .. that we had a public duty to hold en bancs to lighten their burden." He
added, "some of our number actually found it intellectually stimulating to challenge the
Supreme Court from time to time," although, he added, they "usually were rewarded by
a Nine Zip reversal." E-mail from Judge Alfred T. Goodwin, Circuit Judge, 9th Circuit
Court of Appeals, to author (July 29, 1999) (on file with author); interview with Judge
Alfred T. Goodwin, Circuit Judge, 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, in Pasadena, Cal. (Oct.
10, 1999) (on file with author).
54. 956 F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated by Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509
U.S. 43 (1993).
55. 498 U.S. 479 (1991). The Ninth Circuit's ruling was vacated by Reno v. Catholic
Social Services, 509 U.S. 43 (1993).
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Pregerson, in the 1993 Casey v. Lewis prison conditions case,
complained that the panel majority relied on two cases from
other circuits which "rely on mischaracterizations of Supreme
Court decisions" and also provided no basis for what he claimed
was the majority's departure from Ninth Circuit precedent. 56 It
can also be seen in the District of Columbia Circuit's statement,
in the course of disagreeing with two other circuits that "[we
think our sister circuits have paid insufficient attention to [the]
Supreme Court's decision."57
PART IV. MENTION AND DISCUSSION IN PUBLISHED
OPINIONS
In this part of the article, we turn to a detailed examination
of the judges' mention and discussion of cases from other
circuits. While in Part V, we will look at their discussion during
the decision-making leading up to the release of their published
opinions, in this part, we look at what the judges say in those
opinions. Here, we turn first to noncontentious citation of cases
from other circuits, including the tendency to go along with what
those other courts have said and to avoid intercircuit conflict.
We then treat how judges deal with intercircuit conflict, either
claimed or acknowledged, followed by a look at responses by the
majority to dissenters' claims of intercircuit conflict.
A. Noncontentious Citation.
When courts of appeals consider case law from other
circuits, most references to those rulings are without dispute or
contention. General citation practice leads a court to cite not
only to its own earlier cases, but also to cases from other courts
on various points of law. One such use is to provide an example
of a general point. Another is as part of a string citation of cases
supporting positions being taken. This illustrates that many
courts have taken the same position, as in the claim that "[a]ll
the circuits which have spoken on this point have agreed
that.. ." As Hellman notes, "When a judge chooses to cite out-
of-circuit authority, the precedent generally will be one that
supports the position taken in the opinion."58
56. Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1529 (9th Cir. 1993) (Pregerson, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
57. United States ex rel. -Long v. SCS Bus. & Technical Inst., 173 F.3d 870, 882
(D.C.Cir. 1999).
58. Hellman, supra note 1, at 1067.
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U.S. courts of appeals may engage in mutual citation, and
one circuit may even cite to another circuit's ruling that has
cites to the initial circuit's decision. For example, Judge
Goodwin quoted a Third Circuit case which indicated the side of
a circuit split the Ninth Circuit had adopted,59 and in another
case, he noted a Tenth Circuit case which had "agreed with the
Ninth Circuit's analysis."60 Another example shows that judges
do not always draw on other circuits' majority opinions but may
instead utilize dissenting judges' views. In acknowledging a
conflict with the Fourth Circuit while refusing to change Ninth
Circuit precedent, Judge Leavy, in Rambo v. Director, referred
to the dissent in the Fourth Circuit which had pointed out the
direct conflict of the Fourth Circuit majority with the Ninth
Circuit. 61
If the issue before the court of appeals is one of first
impression nationally, by definition there will be no rulings from
other circuits with which to agree or disagree. However, an
issue is likely to have arisen elsewhere even if it is one of first
impression in the circuit. This will likely lead the judges
considering the matter to mention what other circuits have
done, even if those rulings do not become a major part of the
court's analysis. Where "no precedent of the home circuit proves
helpful in resolving" the question before the court, Hellman
says, "we would expect at least one of the participants to cast a
wider net in the hope of finding persuasive authority more
closely on point."62
Thus, in an important ruling on sanctions against lawyers
under Rule 11, Judge Schroeder alluded to other circuits'
rulings, observing that, because the issue was a new one,
59. McGuire v. City of Portland, 91 F.3d 1293, 1294 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing
Balgowan v. N. J. Dept. of Trans., 84 F.3d 656 (3rd Cir. 1996)), op. withdrawn on reh'g,
108 F.3d 1182.
60. United States v. Jackson, 167 F.3d 1280, 1284 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing U.S. v.
Bush, 70 F.3d 557 (10th Cir. 1995)); see also United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 975 F.2d
1396 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd 511 U.S. 350 (1994). This discussion produces the possibility
of a sort of autoregression, with a court citing another court citing the first court, which
had earlier cited the other court, etc.. See United States v. Edwards, 13 F.3d 291, 294
(9th Cir. 1993), noting that the Fifth Circuit, in its Lopez ruling, had "considered and
rejected our reasoning in [United States v.] Evans," 928 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1991),
indicates what can happen.
61. Rambo v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 28 F.3d 86, 87-88 (9th
Cir.1994) (noting Fleetwood v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 776 F.2d
1225 (4th Cir. 1985) (Warriner, J., dissenting)), rev'd Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v.
Rambo, 515 U.S. 291 (1995).
62. Hellman, supra note 1, at 1061.
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"relatively few decisions have as yet percolated up to the courts
of appeals." She then characterized those "decisions to date" as
"reflect[ing] the drafters' stated intent to curb delay and expense
caused by the filing of unsupported pleadings and motions" and
noted "a dominant theme in the comments made by the Rules'
proponents at the time of its adoption and by its implementers
in the court decisions since its adoption."63
In another decision, on application of Supreme Court
rulings on the filing of petitions for attorney's fees in Social
Security disability cases, Judge Schoeder also made
noncontentious mention of what other courts of appeals had
said. The Ninth Circuit, she said, "decline[d] to be the first
[circuit] to reach... [the] inequitable result" of denying
attorney's fees for a failure to file for them within thirty days of
a final judgment. On her way to that conclusion, she spoke of
"the federal courts' then prevailing practice," which the Supreme
Court had seemed to approve; what "a majority of the federal
courts of appeals" had held; and what "federal courts had
uniformly held" prior to a recent Supreme Court decision which
the Ninth Circuit declined to apply retroactively. 64
Even when there is no dispute about the validity of a point
for which an out-of-circuit case is cited, and no claim that the
circuits differ on the issue, use of out-of-circuit citations without
corresponding ones from within the judge's own court affects the
decision to publish the disposition. The absence of within-circuit
citations in a draft disposition suggests that (a) there is no law
of the circuit on point; (b) the circuit is deciding the question, no
matter how simple, small, or trivial, for the first time; and (c) by
adopting the out-of-circuit position, even if de facto and without
fanfare, the opinion is creating new circuit law. The rule is that
decisions creating new circuit law should be published. In such
situations, either the writing judge will note to fellow panel
members that publication is required under circuit rules, or
another member of the panel is likely to raise the issue,
suggesting either that missing in-circuit precedent be found or
that the ruling be published.
An example is provided by a deportation case, in which
Judge Goodwin sent his concurrence to the disposition author
while saying, "but I think it should be published even though it
63. Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp. 801 F.2d 1531,1537-1538 (9th
Cir. 1986), rehearing en banc denied, 809 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1987).
64. Holt v. Shalala, 35 F.3d 376, 378-381 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Shalala v.
Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292 (1993).
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wasn't argued. The reason for publication includes: ... citation
of a 5th Circuit case, and ... a 1st Circuit case."65 In another
case, 66 however, the author, in a memo to other members of the
panel, argued that reliance on Sentencing Guidelines "(with
reference to other circuit decisions)" was "sufficient to justify not
publishing," particularly as he had "always been reluctant to
publish screening decisions on first impression issues for the
circuit." However, he was willing to publish saying, "I feel that
we have clear guidance from other circuits," a statement which
also illustrates the phenomenon of "going along" with other
circuits.
B. Going Along and the Norm of Avoidance.
What happens when another U.S. court of appeals has
decided a procedural or substantive issue? Does it have any
effect on the next panel from any circuit facing that issue? At a
minimum, those judges must decide at least that the other
circuit's position is acceptable so that they can go along with it.
And, as is implicit in Judge Schroeder's comments (noted above),
judges of one court of appeals often do go along with others'
rulings on the issue. As Hellman observes, "Circuit judges today
generally respect the decisions of other circuits."67 And another
observer has remarked that "circuit court judges are influenced
to some degree by the 'weight' of authority on a given matter."68
This can occur even when only one other circuit is cited,69 or
perhaps two. Thus, in Martinez-Serrano v. I.N.S., concerning
whether an alien's filing of a motion to reopen and reconsider
tolled the time for appealing a deportation order, the Ninth
Circuit panel observed, "The Circuit has not dealt with this
issue. The Second and Fifth Circuits, however, have dealt
directly with this issue," and had adopted the same rule. The
panel then adopted that rule while quoting an earlier case to
65. Memorandum from Judge Alfred T. Goodwin, to 9th Circuit Panel (July 13,
1993) (on file with author) (regarding Yao v. I.N.S., 2 F.3d 317 (9th Cir. 1993)).
66. United States v. Beck, 992 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1993).
67. Arthur D. Hellman, The Unkindest Cut: The White Commission Proposal to
Restructure the Ninth Circuit, 73 So. CAL. L. REV. 377, 383-384 (2000). See id. at 384 n.2
for examples.
68. Lindquist, supra note 16, at 12. This is like the situation in which state courts
look to the "majority position" on contract or tort law issues as indicated in the
Restatements.
69. See e.g., Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 174 F.3d 143 (3rd Cir. 1999)
(agreeing with the Seventh Circuit that a plaintiffs unmedicated state was the basis for
determining whether the person was disabled).
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say, "Absent a strong reason to do so, we will not create a direct
conflict with other circuits."70
One reason for "going along" may be simple agreement with
the other circuits' position. However, it is also possible that the
issue on which the court has been offered competing positions
falls within the judges' zone of indifference, that is, where it does
matter to them one way or another what they do. Given other
courts' prior, and consistent, rulings, there is little or no reason
for them to stake out a different position. This is related to the
fact that adopting other circuits' prior case law is also a matter
of convenience. Although the judges do not put it this way,
adopting the contrary position would require additional work to
justify doing so. Moreover, when many courts which have
considered the issue are in agreement, perhaps because each
followed the lead of the court(s) which "got there first," a sort of
hydraulic pressure to adhere to the existing consensus
develops. 71 This makes it even simpler for the court now facing
the issue to find the other circuits' position to be acceptable and
thus to follow it. Thus we see statements like "[flollowing the
analysis of our sister circuits,"72 and "Most of our sister Circuits
that have considered this question have also reached the
conclusion we reach here today."73
This following-along could be seen as well when the Second
Circuit turned aside a litigant-proposed position that four other
courts of appeals had "expressly rejected," particularly when
that interpretation also "has been implicitly foreclosed by two of
our previous decisions."74 One can see the strength of the
hydraulic pressure in Judge Guido Calabresi's statement that,
because "my views have found no adherence among the other
circuits," and had as well "been forcefully rejected in my own
court," he was "bound both by comity and the respect that I feel
70. Martinez-Serrano v. I.N.S., 94 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing United
States v. Chavez-vernaza, 844 F.2d 1368, 1374 (9th Cir. 1987)).
71. "Stare decisis and the norm of consistency may amplify the general tenor of
early published opinions interpreting a remedial statute if judges seek interpretations
that are consistent with the published decisions of their colleagues." Catherine Albiston,
The Rule of Law and the Litigation Process: The Paradox of Losing by Winning, 33 LAW
& SOC'Y REV. 869, 899 (1999).
72. Singleton v. Cecil, 176 F.3d 419, 420 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (where other
circuits were following Supreme Court precedent).
73. Benjamin v. Jacobson, 172 F.3d 144, 162 (2nd Cir. 1999) (en banc). See also
Johnson v. Oregon Department of Human Resources, 141 F.3d 1361, 1367 (9th Cir.
1998).
74. Davis v. United States, 961 F.2d 867, 875 (9th Cir.1992).
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for my siblings to give great weight" to that fact, although, in
this instance it did not prevent him from declaring that those
judges had decided the issue incorrectly. 75 Indeed, this indicates
that, while speaking of comity, judges may be disinclined to
follow where comity leads unless a case is within their zone of
indifference. Nonetheless, the hydraulic pressure from other
circuits' consistent interpretations also provides strong
ammunition for a prospective dissenter, or an off-panel judge
seeking an en banc rehearing, who argues against the creation
of a conflict.
The likelihood is that one court will go along with its sister
courts even when there is doubt about how to resolve the case. 76
When four courts of appeals had interpreted a statute one way,
while none had adopted a contrary interpretation, the Ninth
Circuit adopted the majority position although "the question is
close, and the statute could reasonably be construed either way."
Judge Kleinfeld for the panel did find "textual support for the
construction reached by the other circuits," but he also said that
"we have been much influenced in the construction we adopt by
the desire to avoid intercircuit conflict" and "there is virtue in
uniformity of federal law as construed by the federal circuits."77
This introduces us to the norm of avoidance of intercircuit
conflict. This is essentially a default position that, other things
being equal, not only should intercircuit conflicts not be created,
but, more strongly, judges should seek to avoid creating or
perpetuating such conflicts. Most judges appear to accept this
norm that intercircuit conflict is to be avoided. They do not
always value cross-circuit uniformity simply for its own sake, as
they are willing to hold to their own position because they
believe the other courts were wrong. There is, however, no
question but that some judges, believing there ought to be
national uniformity in the law, are serious about avoiding
intercircuit conflict as a matter of principle. They will assert
that their own circuit should not intentionally create an
intercircuit conflict and should be careful to distinguish other
circuits' cases with which their own circuit's rulings are
75. Benjamin v. Jacobson, 172 F.3d 144, 189 (2nd Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Calabresi,
J., concurring in result).
76. See King v. United States, 152 F.3d 1200 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Though proper
resolution of the case is not without doubt"). Id at 1202. See also Portland 76
Auto/Truck Plaza v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 153 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 1998) ("[hlow to
construe the statutory language is difficult"). Id at 942.
77. James v. Sunrise Hosp., 86 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1996).
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creating an intercircuit split. In dealing with the requirement
that securities fraud be pleaded with particularity, the Glenfed
Securities Litigation en banc court, disagreeing with the panel's
reliance on two Second Circuit cases, immediately concluded
that the Ninth Circuit should not adopt the Second Circuit's
view of the matter.138 On an important constitutional question,
before the Supreme Court ruled to the contrary, the Ninth
Circuit panel "recognize[d] that our decision upholding the
constitutionality" of the Gun Free School Zones Act "will create
an intercircuit conflict" with the Fifth Circuit's Lopez ruling but
pointed to the Ninth Circuit's prior case law as compelling its
decision. Otherwise, said the panel, it would have to ask for an
en banc hearing to deal with the intracircuit conflict that would
be created by following the Fifth Circuit would create. As the
panel disagreed with the Fifth Circuit's analysis, the judges
applied the court's earlier precedent "without recommending an
en banc hearing."'139 (As we know, it was the Fifth Circuit's
position the Supreme Court upheld. 40 )
At other times, acknowledgment of intercircuit conflict-
creation is relegated to a footnote. For example, Judge Canby,
in dealing with a statute underlying a Social Security disability
regulation, used a note to observe for the court, "Our holding
brings us into conflict with the Sixth Circuit," which had found
the statute ambiguous. "With all respect to the majority of the
Sixth Circuit panel," he stated, "we simply find no ambiguity in
that statute's direction to the Commissioner."' 4 ' Likewise, a
panel in a Sentencing Guidelines case said in a footnote, "We
note that our reading of § 3A1.1 places us in conflict with several
other circuits." 142 This illustrates the point that because court of
appeals judges must deal with many cases, they have little
surplus time in which to engage in intensive analysis of relevant
cases if they do not feel it essential. Thus, "If a judge, after
studying the decisions of his own circuit and of the Supreme
Court, concludes that the outcome of a case should be x, the
judge may see no reason to closely analyze the decision of
138. In re Glenfed Securities Litigation, 42 F.3d 1541, 1545 (9th Cir. 1994).
139. United States v. Edwards, 13 F.3d 291, 294 (9th Cir. 1993).
140. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
141. Newman v. Chater, 87 F.3d 358, 361 n.3 (9th Cir. 1996).
142. United States v. O'Brien, 50 F.3d 751, 755 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1995). It is interesting
that the West note for this case made note of the intercircuit disagreement: "The Court
of Appeals, Tang, Senior Circuit Judge, disagreeing with the First Circuit, held that. .
Id. at 751.
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another circuit that appears to reach a contrary outcome." 143
Nonetheless, there is a normative expectation that
conscientious judges will explain why they depart from, or do
not join, other circuits. An example occurs in Zimmerman v.
Oregon Department of Justice.144 In ruling that Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act did not apply to employment,
Judge Graber explained at some length why, "mindful that most
courts have held that Title II applies to employment," the court
did not agree with other circuits' interpretation. Only when her
analysis of their rulings led to the conclusion that "we simply do
not find them persuasive" did she state, "We realize that our
decision creates an inter-circuit split of authority," adding that
"Although we are hesitant to create such a split, and we do so
only after the most painstaking inquiry, we must follow the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. "145
When the majority ruled in the 1993 Stanton Road
Associates case that the Superfund statute did not authorize
attorney's fees to private litigants as part of response costs in
cleaning up contaminated property, it spent considerable time
examining the Eighth Circuit's analysis, by which the judges
were "unpersuaded. " 146  The importance of providing
explanations can also be seen in a case on the timing of transfers
between individuals, where Judge Hall, having examined other
courts' rulings, commented in a footnote, "We believe that the
reasons we have cited in the text of our opinion are sufficiently
strong to justify our departure from the course plotted by our
sister Circuit." 47
One circuit may draw on other circuits' writings not so
much to support its own position as to reject the contrary
position. This of course increases rather than reduces or
eliminates contention between the circuits. In a relatively small
number of cases in Hellman's sample, "The opinion
acknowledged out-of-circuit authority that was contrary to its
position and explicitly rejected it."148 One occurred when the
143. Hellman, supra note 1, at 1086-1087.
144. 170 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1999).
145. Id. at 1183-1184.
146. Stanton Rd. Assocs. v. Lohrey Enters., 984 F.2d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir. 1993).
147. In re Roosevelt, 87 F.3d 311, 318 n. 14 (9th Cir. 1996). For an example from
another circuit, see United States v. Gatlin, 216 F.3d 207 (2nd Cir. 2000), in which Judge
Cabranes, presenting several reasons, analyzed why the Fourth Circuit's position was
being rejected. Id., at 214-215.
148. Hellman, supra note 1, at 1078.
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Judges' sensitivity to the position the Supreme Court takes
on matters from their court can be seen when they demonstrate
awareness that the Justices might overturn the Ninth Circuit's
position. For example, commenting on a case that was central to
resolution of the matter before the court, the Ninth Circuit
observed in a footnote, "The viability of our holding in [U.S. v.]
Phelps may be in question. The District of Columbia and
Eleventh Circuits have disagreed with our holding on identical
facts, and the Supreme Court has granted certiorari to the
Eleventh Circuit to resolve the conflict.1 24 In another instance,
Ninth circuit judges had been concerned that the Justices'
resolution might go in the other direction. The Supreme Court
had granted certiorari, vacated, and remanded in Brock v. Shirk.
The Ninth Circuit panel members, on remand, noted that in
their initial ruling, which had "followed the controlling
precedent of this circuit," they had "observed prophetically," in a
footnote, "that other circuits have questioned [its] definition of
willful, and that the Supreme Court will likely resolve the
existing conflict." Observed the judges on remand, "The Court
has indeed resolved the matter in McLaughlin v. Richard Shoe
Co. 1 2 5
There are also times when the lower courts' attention is
attracted by the Supreme Court's not having resolved conflicts.
One instance came when Ninth Circuit judges observed that
"the Supreme Court's failure to resolve the circuit split has been
the subject of much discussion and speculation in recent cases"
in several courts. 126 The Supreme Court's inaction concerning a
conflict means that the court of appeals are faced with the task
Pitrat v. Garlikov, 992 F.2d 224, 225 (9th Cir. 1993); see Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S.
753 (1992).
124. United States v. Garcia and Hambrick, 997 F.2d 1273, 1283 n.6 (9th Cir. 1993).
The Supreme Court did indeed adopt the Eleventh Circuit's position, Smith v. United
States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993)(trading gun for drugs is "use" of firearm in relation to drug-
trafficking crime).
125. The initial panel ruling was Brock v. Shirk, 833 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1987); the
Supreme Court vacated and remanded, Shirk v. McLaughlin, 488 U.S. 806 (1988), in
light of McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128 (1988). The ruling on remand is
Brock v. Shirk, 860 F.2d 1545 (9th Cir. 1988). See also Tanner v. Sivley, 76 F.3d 302,
303 (9 th Cir. 1996) ("The Supreme Court's decision.. . disposes of the issue in the case."),
where the Supreme Court granted cert. to resolve an intercircuit conflict on whether a
convicted defendant was entitled to credit against his sentence for pretrial time spent in
a community treatment center.
126. State of Washington v. East Columbia Basin Irrigation District, 105 F.3d 517,
519 (9th Cir. 1997). For another indication of the Supreme Court's not having resolved a
question implicating an intercircuit conflict, see Judge Fernandez's dissent in Windham
v. Merkle,16 F.3d 1092, 1108 and n.4 (9th Cir. 1998).
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of resolving the conflict, although they do not invariably carry it
out. Thus, in dealing with a question under revisions to the
Immigration and Naturalization Act, the Ninth Circuit observed
that "[tihe Supreme Court has not as yet resolved the inter-
circuit conflict" concerning whether Congress had violated the
prohibition on suspending habeas corpus- but then found that to
be "irrelevant to our consideration" because the Ninth Circuit's
earlier ruling was binding on the panel.127
Even worse from the courts of appeals' perspective is that
the justices can create intercircuit conflict, as when a Supreme
Court ruling results in varying positions across the circuits. For
example, in a case in which the justices affirmed the Ninth
Circuit, the appeals court panel noted, "In the wake of Reliable
Transfer, the circuits have considered with sometimes
conflicting results the issue of whether superseding cause may
still be used to attribute fault in admiralty cases."128
4. Choosing Sides in a Conflict.
In judges' eyes, there is a difference between creating an
intercircuit conflict and joining a pre-existing position in a
conflict that has already developed. The latter is considered less
serious, as one can see in seemingly routine mentions that a
conflict exists. However, this does put the court in a much more
difficult position than when several courts all are on one side of
an issue. This difference between finding and creating an
intercircuit conflict can be seen in responses to dissenting judges
who argue that an intercircuit conflict is being created. In
saying that the intercircuit conflict predated the panel's ruling,
the panel majority is saying that even if the ruling is part of
such a conflict, the panel did not create it; others did.
The Ninth Circuit was stepping into a pre-existing conflict
rather than creating one when, in holding that a district court
ruling on "inevitable discovery" was to be reviewed for clear
error, it stated, "Our holding is in accord with the Eleventh
Circuit .... However, it puts us in conflict with the Sixth
Circuit."1 29 It also joined a pre-existing conflict in Chandler v.
127. Magana-Pizano v. I.N.S., 152 F.3d 1213, 1217 n.7 (9th Cir. 1998).
128. Exxon Co. v. Sofec, 54 F.3d 570, 573-574 (9th Cir. 1995), affid 517 U.S. 830
(1996). The panel affirmed the Ninth Circuit's previous position, finding it "not necessary
to resolve here whether the Eighth Circuit has proscribed the use of superceding
cause..." Id., at 574. The earlier Supreme Court case is United States v. Reliable
Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975).
129. United States v. Lang, 149 F.3d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir. 1998).
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conflict? Of particular interest is the situation in which
intercircuit conflicts lead to disagreement among the appellate
judges facing them. In about fifty cases of the 260 in Hellman's
study, "the judges who disagreed as to the outcome of the
appeal before them also disagreed as to the import or authority
of the out-of-circuit precedent."8 4 In the typical case of this sort,
both majority and dissenter "treat the same out-of-circuit
decision as squarely on point," with one "embrac[ing] the other
circuit's precedent, while the other would reject it."85
1. Distinguishing of Cases.
How to deal with intercircuit conflict is often a matter of
contention. Judges are often able to avoid involvement in a
conflict by disputing parties' claims that a conflict exists, as
when they say that "[tihe cases cited ... from other circuits are
not in conflict."8 6 Closely related is the rejection of an argument
in part because of the party's failure to call attention to any
conflicting cases from other circuits;8 7 there it is the fact of the
presence (or absence) of intercircuit conflict which is important,
not its substance. Judges may also reject the position of a
colleague which, if adopted, might pose the existence of a
conflict.
When the dissenting judge on a panel opposes adoption of
the position of another court of appeals but does not persuade
his colleagues, intercircuit conflict has not been created, at least
for the time being.88 An example of this situation from the Ninth
Circuit is United States v. Petty.8 9 In that case, the majority
followed the seven courts of appeals to have considered the
application of the Confrontation Clause in Guidelines
sentencing, all of which had ruled against its application. In
dissent, Judge Noonan spoke of his colleagues' "admirable desire
for harmony with other circuits and understandable
unwillingness to challenge the conventional wisdom suggested
84. Hellman, supra note 1, at 1073.
85. Id. at 1075.
86. Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 89 F.3d 594, 598 (9th Cir. 1996).
87. See United States v. Adler, 152 F.3d 929 (Table), 1998 WL 382702 (9th Cir.
1998).
88. See Hellman, supra note 1, at 1076, providing as an example, Stanton Road
Associates v. Lohrey Enterprises, 984 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1983). The conflict in that
case, which is discussed below, was ultimately resolved in Key Tronic Corp v. United
States, 511 U.S. 809 (1994).
89. 982 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1993).
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by their decisions" but thought that other principles override
such comity.90
Just as lawyers regularly avoid the effect of cases by
distinguishing them, a strategy for judges is to distinguish the
cases which are alleged to create a conflict. Conceding a
conflict's pre-existence is a potential response by a panel
majority to a colleague's claim that the majority's position will
create one. However, it is a response that does little to avoid the
need to choose one side over another. That helps explain why,
when faced with a claim that an intercircuit conflict exists or is
about to be created, one response is to deny that the claimed
conflict exists, primarily because the allegedly conflicting cases
can be distinguished. When litigants or a colleague claim that
adoption of a certain position would create an intercircuit
conflict,91 the panel majority may respond by distinguishing the
proffered cases. An example is a dissenting judge's rejection of a
case from another circuit, in which the judge characterized the
case as having rejected the Ninth Circuit panel majority's
position. In response the majority said "we don't see how" the
other case could be so viewed because plaintiffs in the other
circuit were in a different posture with respect to administrative
agency action from those in the present case.92
At times, there is not a direct disagreement or conflict over
the basic holding or rule of law, but there is disagreement with
another circuit's approach or its reasoning, as when the Fifth
Circuit said that an analogy drawn by the Second Circuit, "while
conceptually clear, is flawed."93 The D.C. Circuit provided
another example. Applying a Supreme Court ruling, the court
"agree[d] with the Second Circuit's conclusion but not with all of
its reasoning."94 However, at other times, distinguishing another
circuit's work can be equivalent, or at least close, to rejecting it.
This occurred when an Eleventh Circuit panel set aside cases
90. Id. at 1370 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
91. As to a litigant's claim of conflict, see Chandler v. United States Army, 125
F.3d 1296, 1301 (9th Cir. 1997) (although in this case the court found itself "unable to
avoid an intercircuit conflict" on another element of the case.) Id. at 1302.
92. American Ass'n of Cosmetology Schs v. Riley, 170 F.3d 1250, 1254 n. 4 (9th Cir.
1999). See also Fajardo v. County of Los Angeles, 175 F.3d 698 (9th Cir. 1999)
(particularly Judge Pregerson's response for the majority, at 701 n.4, to Judge Kleinfeld's
separate concurrence, at 703).
93. United States ex rel. Foulds v. Texas Tech. Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 291 n.18 (5th
Cir. 1999).
94. Kalka v. Hawk, 215 F.3d 90 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (applying County of Sacramento v.
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998)).
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arguably in conflict. Thus disagreement over application of cases
from other circuits, whether on the basis that some can be
distinguished, may occur without the judges engaging in a
debate over an intercircuit conflict.7 8 Instead of being dismissive
of what other circuits have done even while disagreeing with
them, the judges instead devote serious, extended attention to
the competing positions in other courts' opinions.
The norm gives a claim of intercircuit conflict considerable
weight. It prompts those said by their colleagues to have
created such conflicts to treat those claims seriously and to give
them due attention. Thus, a judge may make a claim of
intercircuit conflict to prod colleagues into a response about a
case because the claim places on them the burden of defending
their position.
The strength of the norm may be seen in the oft-stated
position that intercircuit conflict should be created only in
extreme circumstances. That leaves the question, "What is
'extreme'? However, the view is prevalent that "[w]e do not
lightly create a conflict with other circuits"79 and "we avoid
unnecessary conflicts with other circuits"80 -although the latter
likewise begs the question of what is "unnecessary." The norm
is also particularly evident when a judge goes out of his or her
way to note that a conflict is not being created - that one should
not read the court's opinion as if it did conflict with another
circuit's position.8'
C. Responses to Claimed and Actual Conflict.
We begin by noting that there is some noncontentious
78. See e.g., United States v. Isaacson, 155 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1998), in which both
Judge Fletcher, for the majority, and Judge Fernandez, in dissent, discuss cases from the
Fourth and Tenth Circuits. Judge Fletcher agrees with those courts' approach. See id. at
1085. Judge Fernandez finds that the Fourth Circuit's analysis does not conflict with
other circuits' cases. See id. at 1089.
79. Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204 (9th Cir. 1995).
80. Hale v. State of Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1393 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc). The
panel in this case noted, "As Judge Rymer reminds us, we are to avoid creating
intercircuit conflict when possible." (quoting Gilbreath, 931 F.2d 1320, 1328 n. 1 (9th Cir.
1991) (Rymer, J., concurring)). See also United States v. Gwaltney, 790 F.2d 1378, 1388
n. 4 (9th Cir. 1986) (in responding to a judge's dissent, the majority wrote, "Unnecessary
conflicts among the circuits are to be avoided.") A case a year later than Gwaltney often
cited for the same proposition is United States v. Larm, 824 F.2d 780, 784 (9th Cir.
1987). Both Gwaltney and Larm are cited in United States v. Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d
1368, 1374 (9th Cir. 1987).
81. See Candelore v. Clark County Sanitation Dist., 975 F.2d 588, 592 (9th Cir.
1992) (Kleinfeld, J., concurring).
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mention of intercircuit conflict and then turn to judges' attempts
to deal with claims of conflicts. If the fact of an intercircuit
conflict may be case-determinative, or at least relevant to case
outcome, the intercircuit conflict may simply be mentioned in
passing, when judges state the relevant case law as background.
Where previous conflicts have been resolved by the Supreme
Court or by others, 'conflict as fact' will be mentioned, as when
the Sentencing Commission has resolved disputes over
interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines, or when Congress
has stepped in to resolve an intercircuit dispute. Failure to
resolve an intercircuit dispute -particularly when the Supreme
Court has not done so- will also be mentioned as a fact.
Although court of appeals judges may wish that the Supreme
Court had resolved intercircuit disputes, mention of such failure
is not usually contentious.
There are also instances where a difference between circuits
in interpretation of the law is not a matter to be resolved but
instead is taken as constituting a legal fact relevant to the
disposition of the present case. For example, in seeking to
determine if a defendant official should be granted qualified
immunity from suit, intercircuit conflict has been taken as
evidence of the lack of clarity in the law which provides a basis
for such immunity; for immunity to be denied, the law must be
so clear that an official could know his acts violated someone's
rights. If the U.S. courts of appeals cannot agree on the law,
how can one expect it to be sufficiently clear for an official to
know it?82 Conversely, the fact of the absence of an intercircuit
conflict may be relevant. For example, a Ninth Circuit panel
used that fact, among others, in denying an injunction sought by
those who would have set aside California's Proposition 209.83
Often, however, there is a definite disagreement among the
judges as to whether there is a conflict, or there is a clear
intercircuit conflict, with which the judges must contend. What
do court of appeals judges do in that situation? What do they do
upon finding themselves faced with a conflict, or a claim of a
82. See Schroeder v. Kaplan, 60 F.3d 834 (Table), 1995 WL 398878 n.2 (9th Cir.
1995) (dissenting judge, citing conflicts between Seventh Circuit and another circuit:
"there was sufficient conflict among the circuits regarding the right to be free from
exposure to ETS during this time to prevent a reasonable government official from
understanding that there was a clearly established right"). See also McClure v. City of
Long Beach, 104 F.3d 365 (Table), 1996 WL 740816 (9th Cir. 1996), citing Lume v.
Jensen, 876 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1989) (presence of intercircuit conflict taken as evidence
that a right has not been fully established).
83. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 718, 719 (9th Cir. 1997).
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from three other circuits permitting transfer of successive
habeas petitions to the court of appeals because those courts
"did not analyze §1631 or explain why it was appropriate
authority for the transfer."95
In a Ninth Circuit instance, a panel majority, which noted
that the Ninth Circuit had "not yet decided this issue," first said
that "our sister circuits have reached conflicting results" and
then found all cases "denying Constitutional status to allocation"
to be "factually distinguishable"; the panel also added that the
reasoning of those cases was "unpersuasive" and their rule had
not been adopted. 96 Likewise, when agreeing with the Seventh
Circuit to hold that application of an amendment to the
supervised release statute to defendants violated the Ex Post
Facto clause, the Ninth Circuit distinguished a Third Circuit
ruling that "appears to conflict with the Seventh Circuit's
decision." The court went on to state that the Third Circuit
ruling differed in not addressing a key matter, and "[flor that
reason, we elect, with all due respect, to follow the Seventh
Circuit rather than the Third Circuit on this issue."97
2. Acknowledging the Conflict.
Although joining conflict is often unavoidable, at times
judges only acknowledge a conflict by mentioning it and moving
on without further discussion to decide the case. While, as we
have noted, judges may assert the nonexistence of a conflict,
many times they do acknowledge its existence. In a study of the
Supreme Court's 1989-1991 Terms, Lindquist found that in
almost three-fourths of the cases she examined, "the majority
opinion recognized the conflict in one form or another."9 8 As
Hellman observes, "Acknowledgment of conflict can take a
variety of forms": through explicit rejection of another court's
precedent, declining to follow it, by "respectfully disagreeing", by
"reading the law differently", or, ultimately, by choosing one side
over another."99 Although acknowledgment without action can
occur even when the court's own ruling is part of the intercircuit
conflict, it appears to be more likely when only out-of circuit
cases conflict with each other.
95. Guenther v. Holt, 173 F.3d 1328, 1330 n.4 (11th Cir. 1999).
96. Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523, 1528-1529 (9th Cir. 1992).
97. United States v. Collins, 118 F.3d 1394, 1398 (9th Cir. 1997).
98. Lindquist, supra note 16, at 14.
99. Hellman, supra note 20, at 29.
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In examples of judges acknowledging an intercircuit conflict
without doing more, one panel noted simply, "There is a conflict
of authority in other circuits whether Younger abstention may
be applied to §1983 claims for monetary damages." 100 In a case
on a sentencing enhancement for a defendant's leadership role
in a crime, the judges only stated, "There is a conflict among the
circuits" on that issue. 10 1 And the judges dealing with whether
Indian tribes could sue states or whether such suits were barred
by Eleventh Amendment stated, "There is an existing circuit
conflict on this issue."1 0 2 In this instance, one of the cases cited
was the Eleventh Circuit's Seminole Tribe ruling, which the
Supreme Court accepted and affirmed. 10 3 Likewise, in dealing
with the constitutionality of the Child Pornography Protection
Act (CPPA), the Fourth Circuit mentioned initially, "The federal
courts of appeals that have considered this issue are split on its
proper resolution." It then identified the circuits taking the
respective sides. Having again stated this division and noting
that they were "[mlindful of the conflicting views that have
emerged,"'0 4 the judges then moved on to their own discussion of
the matter.
In still another case, the Ninth Circuit pointed to a circuit
split by saying, "As the Third Circuit has noted." Then it moved
on to further discussion of Ninth Circuit law. What makes this
case interesting is that one of the judges, concurring separately,
first said concerning Eighth and Eleventh Circuit decisions that
"Our circuit law clearly conflicts with these rulings," and then
offered an explanation for the "conflict in circuits." He thought
it "likely due to the fact that the Department of Labor
regulations are not easily applied to public employees." 0 5
When acknowledging the existence of a conflict, judges may
explicitly state that they are not resolving it. Thus, after noting
that "[tihe circuits are divided about whether bankruptcy courts
are 'courts of the United States' so that they could award
attorney's fees under certain statutes, Ninth Circuit Judge
Cynthia Hall sidestepped the issue by writing for the court, "We
express no opinion on the issue" - because it was not the
100. Martinez v. Newport Beach City, 125 F.3d 777, 781 n.4 (9th Cir. 1997).
101. United States v. Neal, 33 F.3d 60 (9th Cir. 1994) (Table).
102. Spokane Tribe of Indians v. Washington, 28 F.3d 991, 993 (9th Cir. 1994).
103. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 1994), affd, 517
U.S. 44 (1996).
104. United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 917 (4th Cir. 2000).
105. McGuire v. City of Portland, 91 F.3d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1996).
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drawing on out-of-circuit cases to support a different outcome or
to assert that the majority is creating an intercircuit conflict are
quite likely to have been known to the other panel members
through a memorandum from the judge raising the matter, as
we will see in Part V. The panel members will also usually have
exchanged views about the matter, and the majority judges and
their clerks will have reviewed the proposed dissent and perhaps
modified their opinion in response to it.
1. Absence of Response.
Dialogue over putative intercircuit conflicts does not always
occur. Indeed, we must first ask whether the majority responds
to the dissenter at all. Given the importance of intercircuit
conflict, we might expect a dissenter's claim to be taken
seriously and thus to receive a public response. Yet often there is
no response from the panel majority, leaving numerous cases in
which an intercircuit conflict is discussed only by the dissenter
who claimed it. This occurred, for example, when Judge
Kozinski, saying that the majority's view conflicted with an
earlier Ninth Circuit ruling "as well as the opinions of two other
circuits," dissented to a holding that a subcontractor had a due
process interest in moneys withheld for failure to comply with
prevailing wage rates. 159 The majority, although refering to
cases from other circuits to support its position on attorney fees,
did not discuss the possible circuit conflict which Judge Kozinski
said existed over the principal issue.
Of course, the majority's mention of cases to which the
dissenter refers does not necessarily equal a response. This can
be seen in a Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act (PACA)
case involving whether a putative officer was "responsibly
connected" to a company. The majority, speaking through Judge
Schroeder, relied on District of Columbia Circuit case law but
did not speak to whether, as Judge Kozinski claimed, it was
thereby "creating a circuit conflict" because, as he claimed,
"those cases do not support the majority's conclusion."160
In another case, involving the method of calculating weekly
wages for an injured seaman, Judge Reed (of the District of
159. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 136 F.3d 587, 602 (9th Cir. 1998)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting), amended, 156 F.3d 893, 907 (9th Cir. 1998). The Supreme
Court granted certiorari, vacated and remanded, 526 U.S. 1061 (1999), in light of
American Mfr's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999).
160. Maldonado v. Dep't. of Agric., 154 F.3d 1086, 1089 and n.1 (9th Cir. 1998)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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Nevada, sitting by designation) pointed to a Seventh Circuit
case and said the Ninth Circuit majority, by presumptively
applying a statute, "has consciously created an inter-Circuit
conflict."16' The majority opinion, however, contains no mention
of the Seventh Circuit case, much less of the purported conflict.
Likewise, in a case about the application of the expedited review
provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA), when the panel majority held a prisoners' suit within
the Ex parte Young exception to states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity, 16 2 the panel made no response to Judge Beezer's
comment in dissent that he "would avoid the intercircuit conflict
of decision in a matter of national concern that is created by the
rejection of the [Fourth Circuit's] holding in our court's
opinion."163
There was also no response when Judge Norris, who found
the case of a Ninth Circuit plaintiff "on all fours with" a Fifth
Circuit's en banc ruling, claimed "the majority has created as
intercircuit conflict with the Fifth Circuit" over Airline
Deregulation Act preemption of state law claims.1 64 (Later, the
court, en banc, overruled the position the panel had taken.165)
Nor was there one in a case where the majority ruled that a
retroactive amendment to a tax statute would violate due
process; when he claimed, in a dissent, "The majority, in
reaching a different conclusion [from other courts], creates a
split among the circuits, as well as a conflict with our own, older
precedent." 66
Why doesn't a majority respond? The press of business from
other cases is one important consideration. The judges may
already have considered the dissenter's claims, and, having
perhaps made accommodations to the dissenter and reworked its
opinion several times, decide to stand by it, they see no reason to
161. Matulic v. Director, Office of Workers Compen. Programs, 154 F.3d 1052, 1061
(9th Cir. 1998) (Reed, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
162. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
163. Ashmus v. Calderon, 123 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 1997) (Beezer, J.,
dissenting), rev'd, 523 U.S. 740 (1998).
164. Harris v. Am. Airlines, 55 F.3d 1472, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995) (Norris, J.,
dissenting).
165. Charas v. Trans World Airlines, 160 F.3d 1259 (9th Cir. 1998).
166. Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051, 1064 (9th Cir. 1992) (Norris, J.,
dissenting); see also United States v. Spencer, 981 F.2d 1083, 1092 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1992)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting), where Judge Reinhardt suggested that his colleagues had
engaged in an "unnecessary and perhaps unwitting creation of an inter-circuit conflict"
in holding there was no error in excluding an arrest report with information helpful to
the defendant."
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the majority, but his claims were not discussed.173
After the fact, an implicit dialogue of sorts may be said to
have occurred if the majority, even though not providing a direct
response, discusses the elements of the conflict about which the
dissenter complains. For example, both sides spoke about same
cases in the Proa-Tovar case. 174 The majority held that a
deportation order could, be challenged collaterally, and ruled
that an appointed counsel's decision to forego an appeal was not
a knowing waiver by the alien, who did not have to show
prejudice. Acknowledging that three circuits had interpreted the
Supreme Court's Mendoza-Lopez ruling175 "to require a showing
of prejudice in [a] collateral challenge," the majority stated that
it was "a better reading of Mendoza-Lopez to read it as a bright-
line rule and to the INS to make certain that every person
deported as the result of an administrative hearing was
adequately apprized, on the record, of his right to appeal."176 In
dissent, Judge Farris, after noting the majority's
acknowledgment of other circuits' position, argued, "We should
not create a conflict among the circuits to salvage the dicta" in a
Ninth Circuit case." 77
A case several years later, on whether an administrator's
failure to adjust an equity limit for inflation was unreasonable,
provides another example. Judge Pregerson for the majority
cited, and also discussed, cases from several circuits. He agreed
that the dollar figure "was valid when first established" but
disagreed with its continuing validity in the face of inflation. His
further discussion dealt with those cases extensively. Dissenting
173. Another en banc case in which dissenters received no response also illustrates
how intercircuit variation in legal interpretation can affect financial transactions which
reach across circuit boundaries, yet one circuit is faced with having to rule on some
aspect of those transactions. The case is In re Robert L. Helms Construction and
Development Co., 139 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 1998)(en banc). A bankruptcy court had applied
the law of its own circuit, but a contested transaction involved in the bankruptcy had
taken place in another circuit which had different law. Judges Thomas and Hawkins
complained that the Ninth Circuit, "[bly imposing our view of how option contracts
should be treated... on a Fifth Circuit bankruptcy, . . unnecessarily intrudes upon the
law of another circuit," and had created an intercircuit conflict with the Fifth Circuit but
also "resolved the conflict by declaring Fifth Circuit authority inapplicable to a Texas
bankruptcy," counter to the demands of '[clomity and simple respect for our colleagues
in another circuit." Id. at 707-708 (Thomas, J., concurring part, dissenting in part).
Despite the strength with which this claim was made, the majority did not mention the
case the dissenters had pressed.
174. See United States v. Proa-Tovar, 945 F.2d 1450, 1450 (9th Cir. 1991).
175. United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987).
176. 945 F.2d at 1453.
177. Id. at 1455 (Farris, J., dissenting).
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Judge Kozinski, in claiming that the majority "raises a direct
conflict with every other circuit that has considered the issue,"
discussed the same cases. 178
The same sort of implicit dialogue between the panel and
off-panel judges took place in a case involving the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). The panel disagreed with the
Second Circuit's use of legislative history but agreed with its
result, and thus did not see an intercircuit conflict. 179 On the
other hand, four judges who dissented from the denial of
rehearing en banc thought the panel had decided the issue at
hand "incorrectly, in a manner that conflicts with the Second
Circuit's interpretation of the same statutory language." The
Second Circuit, these judges said, had "arriv[ed] at a conclusion
precisely opposite" to that reached by the Ninth Circuit panel;
they did acknowledge that the Second Circuit's "approach is
supported by the Eighth Circuit" but thought the Second Circuit
had "much the better overview of IRGA." i80
2. Types of Response.
Despite these instances of non-response or of only implicit
dialogue without explicit discussion, there are many instances
where the majority does address the matter openly. Here we
look at the types of responses the majority does make.
Although the dissenter usually says more about intercircuit
conflicts than does the majority, there are instances in which
there is extensive majority treatment of the cases which the
dissenter only briefly claims cause an intercircuit conflict. For
example, in Craft v. Campbell Soup, on whether the Federal
Arbitration Act applies to labor or employment contracts, the
majority noted early in its per curiam opinion, "Courts have
developed two interpretations of these [statutory] provisions."
The judges then discussed the positions of the "majority of
178. Gamboa v. Rubin, 80 F.3d 1338, 1351-1352 (9th Cir. 1996) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting); Id. at 1343-1344, 1347 (Pregerson, J.). Judge Kozinski went beyond
claiming an intercircuit conflict when he said with respect to the other circuits' cases
that the majority "actually overrules them by precluding the agency from applying the
regulation even where the regional circuit has upheld it." Id. at 1351. Although the
court did take this case en banc, it did not reach the merits, dismissing it for lack of a
final judgment-a ruling in which Judge Kozinski joined. Gamboa v. Chandler, 101 F.3d
90 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
179. Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Indians v. Wilson, 64 F.3d 1250, 1259 n. 5
(9th Cir. 1994)
180. Id. at 1252-1253 and 1253 n.1 (Canby, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc).
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more narrowly.' 92
These are numerous cases in which a majority distinguishes
cases mentioned in the dissent. One instance related to Judge
Ferguson's claim that "the court today unnecessarily creates a
conflict with the only other circuit to have considered" the issue
of whether a district court should accept a foreign expert's
declaration as to the proper application of foreign law.193 For
the majority, Judge Brunetti directly stated the dissent's
contention and then said, "To the contrary, that case is easily
distinguished;" he followed that assertion with a paragraph
drawing such a distinction. 194 Several years before, when Judge
Ferguson had likewise dissented on the basis that the majority
in an ERISA case had created a conflict with three circuits, the
majority both explained why a party's reliance on one of the
cases he cited was "misplaced" and then pointed to "significant
differences" between an Eighth Circuit case he cited and the
present case. 195
Another example is a case which implicated Supreme Court
law as well as rulings of another circuit. It concerned to whom a
ship's seller owed a duty of protection from a dangerous
defective condition, and for what items compensation could be
recovered. Judge Noonan claimed the panel "abandon[ed]" the
leading Supreme Court case "and puts this circuit in conflict
with another major maritime circuit."1 96 The majority, however,
while noting that "[Tihe Fifth Circuit has developed some
principles in this area," concluded, "We are faced here with a
slightly different situation" from the one addressed by the Fifth
Circuit. Moreover, it said a later Fifth Circuit decision
mentioned by Judge Noonan was "not in conflict with [the]
principle" the panel had adopted. 97
The next year, when the majority held unconstitutionally
vague the "decency and respect" standard Congress had required
the National Endowment for the Arts to apply, Judge Kleinfeld
192. Executive Software N. Am. v. U.S. District Court, Central District of
California, 24 F.3d 1545, 1564 (9th Cir. 1994)(Leavy, J., dissenting); id. at 1550.
193. Universe Sales Co. v. Silver Castle, 182 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 1999)
(Ferguson, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 1038-39.
195. Thomas, Head & Greisen Employees Trust v. Buster, 24 F.3d 1114, 1118 (9th
Cir. 1994). For Judge Ferguson's dissent, see id. at 1121.
196. Saratoga Fishing Co. v. Marco Seattle Inc., 69 F.3d 1432, 1447 (9th Cir. 1995)
(Noonan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
197. Saratoga Fishing Co., 69 F.3d at 1444. The case was reversed, Saratoga
Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875 (1997).
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asserted, "Our decision today creates a conflict with the only
other circuits to have confronted a similar issue."198 The
majority did not address other circuits' cases but talked about
Supreme Court doctrine, it also addressed the dissent briefly by
asserting that the two cases on which it relied "are
distinguishable" and were decided before a recent Supreme
Court ruling, Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of
Virginia,199 which had changed the legal landscape. 200 Judge
Kleinfeld in turn dealt with that brief effort by saying, "The
majority tries to distinguish" two circuits' cases because of their
timing in relation to the Supreme Court's decision, an attempt
he obviously found unsatisfactory. 20 1
Despite these numerous instances of the majority
distinguishing the dissenter's proffered cases, as one might
expect, there are instances when majority and dissenters do
"engage" over the latter's claim of an intercircuit conflict. Blazak
v. Ricketts provides an example. 20 2 There the per curiam
majority of Judges Tang and Brunetti held that an order
granting habeas corpus was a final order and thus appealable
even though the habeas court had not addressed punishment
issues. Dissenting, Judge Beezer pointed to a recent Eleventh
Circuit case to contrary, which he said "effectively reversed a
conflict with the Eighth Circuit referred to by Justice White, so
that both the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits held a position
contrary to that of the Ninth Circuit.20 3 The majority responded,
first stating Judge Beezer's position,"The dissent insists that the
recent case of Clisby v. Jones. . . 'clearly undermined' the
[Eleventh Circuit] decision in Blake (and, by virtue of its citation
to Blake, the [Fifth Circuit] decision in Young)" on which the
majority had relied. Saying, with respect to the dissenter's
198. Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671, 685 (1996)
(Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). When several judges (including Judge Kleinfeld) later
dissented from the court's denial to rehear the case en banc, their language was even
stronger: "The majority's opinion does far more than give a hostile construction to a
Congressional enactment in order to create a conflict with other circuits and Supreme
Court precedent, and overturn a law." Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 112
F.3d 1015, 1016 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1997)(O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc). The Supreme Court did reverse. See, National Endowment for the Arts v.
Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
199. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
200. Finley, 100 F.3d, at 682 n. 21.
201. Id. at 686 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
202. 971 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1992).
203. Id. at 1417. See also Kemp v. Blake, 474 U.S. 998 (1985)(White, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
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circuits" and of the "few courts" which had adopted the opposite
position,181 and closely examined the analysis in the conflicting
cases. Dissenting Judge Brunetti, on the other hand, observed
only that "[Tloday, the majority goes against the great weight of
circuit authority" and attached a footnote, "As the majority
concedes, almost every circuit to have considered this question
directly has held that the employment exclusion clause of §1
should be interpreted narrowly."18 2
At times, the majority discusses the cases cited by the
dissenter but does not discuss the claimed intercircuit conflict
per se. An example, involving a claim that existing conflict had
been made worse rather than created, is the Butros en banc.'8 3
This case involved the point at which an alien's status is "finally
determined" with respect to eligibility for discretionary relief
from deportation. Writing one of two dissents, Judge Trott
(joined by Judge Brunetti) spoke of the majority's position as one
that "aggravate[s] what is already a sorry state of inter-circuit
conflicts." He then noted the circuits in which "the current rule
is that lawful status is terminated in connection with a petition
for §212(c) relief when a deportation order becomes
administrative final," and those in which, by contrast, "the cutoff
date of the accrual of the time needed for §212(c) eligibility is
neither the date the deportation order becomes administratively
final, nor the date the Board may not longer reconsider or
reopen the case, but the date 'upon which the INS commences
the deportation proceedings';" in the states of the Second Circuit,
he added, "it is unclear what the rule on eligibility is."184 The
majority said "we have no quarrel with" the relevant Board of
Immigration Appeals ruling "as it was affirmed and interpreted"
by the Second Circuit, nor with the Ninth Circuit's earlier
position, but did not discuss circuit conflict per se. 8 5
When the majority does respond to a dissenter's intercircuit
conflict claim, it does not necessarily do so extensively. Thus,
although the majority explicitly notes the conflict claim, its
response concerning may be minimal. One such instance was
the Meinhold case, in which the majority affirmed a district
181. Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083, 1085-86 and n. 6 (9th Cir. 1998);
see also id., at 1091-1093.
182. Id. at 1094, n. 1 (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
183. Butros v. Immigration & Naturalization Servs., 990 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir.
1993)(en banc).
184. Id. at 1151 (Trott, J., dissenting).
185. Id., 1145-46.
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court ruling that the government's legal position on discharging
homosexuals from the military was not substantially justified. 8 6
Judge Kozinski, dissenting, thought that the majority's
disposition "causes a conflict with four other circuits that have
held the government may discharge members of the armed
forces for saying they are homosexuals" and claimed that his
colleagues did "not acknowledge these conflicts."18 7 The majority
did not run up the "Conflict!" flag. However, counter to Judge
Kozinski, it did acknowledge the conflict without the use of the
term when it discussed two of the cases Judge Kozinski cited; it
treated one in a long sentence and noted that another did
support the government's position.188
Another instance of limited response came in a case
applying the Higher Education Act's anti-injunction provision.
Judge Reinhardt, dissenting, asserted that "the only other
circuit to have considered the precise question presented by the
instant litigation concluded that §1082(a)(2) does not bar
declaratory relief,"and also said that in "analogous contexts," the
First Circuit had read an identical provision in another statute
not to bar injunctive relief.189 The majority's response was
limited to a footnote on the First Circuit case, saying "we don't
see how," given the posture of that case, Judge Reinhardt could
so characterize it.190
This case also illustrates that, just as a panel may deal with
other circuits' cases cited by the parties by distinguishing them,
so a panel majority may respond to a dissenter by distinguishing
the cases supposedly creating a conflict. At times the majority's
distinguishing of a case is not direct and might better be called
finessing the case to which the dissenter has called attention.
Thus, when Judge Leavy, dissenting, claimed that the majority's
ruling that a district court had committed clear error in not
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over pendent state law
claims without giving written reasons "puts us in conflict with
other circuits," the majority did not explicitly distinguish, but
it' 9' did address those decisions, saying "other circuits construe
the collateral order doctrine in this context more broadly ... and
186. Meinhold v. U.S. Dep't of Defense, 123 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1997).
187. Id. at 1281 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 1279.
189. Am. Ass'n of Cosmetology Sch. v. Riley, 170 F.3d 1250, 1256 (9th Cir. 1999)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 1254.
191. Id. at 1254, n. 4.
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claim, "This is not true," the majority proceeded to explain the
Eleventh Circuit's position.20 4
PART V. DISCUSSION DURING DECISION-MAKING
We have discussed judges' treatment of intercircuit
conflicts in their published opinions. We also need to examine
whether and how the judges have dealt with claims of
intercircuit conflicts prior to these written manifestations of
their views, and it is to that we now turn. In some ways, judges'
treatment of out-of-circuit cases and claims about them is not
much different prior to the release of an opinion and after its
release than in the opinion itself, but because we know so little
about the internal processes of courts of appeals, it is important
to give this our attention. Within-panel discussion cannot be
matched with published outcomes for the many cases for which
the former is not available, but we do have both within-panel
exchange and the resulting opinion for some cases.
A. Within the Panel: Before Disposition.
Often, before judges release their opinions, their discussion
of other circuits' rulings and of possible and actual intercircuit
conflicts is simply a noncontentious mention of what other
courts have done. During this time, one judge might suggest to
another that use of an out-of-circuit case be revised. For
example, Judge Goodwin, concurring generally in the author's
draft opinion, said he "would prefer... to modify our discussion"
of an Eighth Circuit case on which the district court had relied,
and the ultimate opinion mentioned the case only to distinguish
it. 20 5 A somewhat atypical reason for mentioning a case, which
illustrates an effect of court of appeals judges sitting in different
circuits, came when a judge, scheduled to sit elsewhere the
following month on a case involving the same bankruptcy issue
as the one before him in the Ninth Circuit, suggested that the
panel's draft opinion "fails to discuss the reasons set forth" in
the latter circuit's case.206 The resulting opinion discussed both
204. 971 F.2d, at 1411.
205. Erdman v. Cochise County, Ariz., 926 F.2d 877, 881 and n. 4 (9th Cir. 1991).
Memoradum from Judge Alfred Goodwin to 9th Circuit panel (Jan. 22 1991)(regarding
the Erdman case)(on file with author); see also also Radecki v. Amoco Oil Co., 858 F.2d
397 (8th Cir. 1988).
206. The reader is reminded that unattributed quotations are taken from internal
court communications.
2002
47
Wasby: Intercircuit Conflicts in the Courts of Appeals
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2002
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
that case and a Third Circuit case. 20 7
In a 1992 case concerning Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) efforts to remove a case to federal court,208 a
judge wrote before argument to the other panel members about
"a very recent Fifth Circuit case" concerning FDIC removal
while a case was on state appeal.20 9 He did so to convey the view
that "the dissenters in that case may have the better of the
argument" so counsel should address that case during oral
argument. After a conference discussion in which another
member of the panel seemed to agree with the Fifth Circuit
majority, the court decided that, given the posture of the case as
it came to the court, the appeal should be dismissed. The opinion
cited the Fifth Circuit case as well as one from the Eleventh
Circuit 210 and noted that "[i]ssues of district court jurisdiction
have recently been considered by other circuits," but that in the
present case, "we cannot address such questions at this time
because there is no appeal before us from an appealable
judgment or order."211
At times judges talk of other circuits' rulings to suggest or
urge their use. In a case on the tax consequences of liquidated
damages under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA),212 one judge wrote to his colleagues, "I think we should
join the Second and Eleventh Circuits" in holding such damages
punitive in nature, while another panel member noted, "I am in
substantial agreement with the Federal Circuit's opinion" that
the government had submitted. All three of the cases were
among the many the court cited in its opinion. 213 In another
case, where the Consumer Products Safety Commission was said
to have improperly made paint a banned hazardous substance,
the presiding judge's post-conference memo called a Fourth
Circuit ruling "the leading case." The opinion called it "the only
circuit decision dealing with similar issues of enforcement under
207. In re Jensen, 995 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1993). See In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co.,
944 F.2d 164, 168 (3rd Cir. 1991); In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad
Co., 974 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1992).
208. F.D.I.C. v. Letterman Brothers, 980 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1992).
209. Matter of Meyerland Co., 960 F.2d 512 (5th Cir. 1992)(en banc).
210. In re Savers Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 872 F.2d 963 (11th Cir. 1989).
211. 980 F.2d, at 1300.
212. Schmitz and Schmitz v. C.I.R., 34 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1994).
213. See Riechman v. Bonsignore, Brignati & Mazzotta, P.C., 818 F.2d 278 (2nd Cir.
1987) (cited at 34 F.3d 795 n. 7); Lindsay v. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 810 F.2d 1094 (11th Cir.
1987) (cited at 34 F.3d at 795 n. 7); Reese v. United States, 24 F.3d 228 (Fed Cir. 1994)
(cited at 34 F.3d at 794).
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especially the asserted conflicts with other circuits"; he sent his
colleagues a lengthy memo, saying he found other circuits' cases
"to be distinguishable on their facts," with one "actually
support[ing] Judge Hug's proposed opinion."223
Disagreement with other members of the court was also
obvious in a case in which two panels dealing with the same
issue were communicating about their differing positions. Judge
Goodwin, writing to other members of the panel on which he sat,
found "not persuasive" the citation by the other panel's author of
a Fourth Circuit case. He further observed that the Fourth
Circuit had "expressed discomfort with its holding and reached
its result only because it had to follow prior Fourth Circuit
precedent." At the same time, he said, "We believe Second
Circuit precedent is in accord with our decision," and that
Second Circuit ruling became the basis for the panel's opinion. 224
The absence of further mention of the Fourth Circuit case
illustrates that a case may be discussed within a panel but
never appear in the opinion. Likewise, after Judge Goodwin
mentioned to his colleagues that an earlier Ninth Circuit ruling
had "explicitly adopted the Seventh Circuit standard" of a
particular case, that out-of-circuit basis for the Ninth Circuit's
position is not again mentioned. 225
B. After the Opinion is Filed.
What happens after a panel files its disposition? While for
many cases, this is the last of the matter, in a significant
number of instances, there is further activity. Not only may the
parties seek rehearing or suggest rehearing en banc, but the
court's other judges may raise questions about the panel's
opinion without necessarily waiting for the parties to act. In this
post-opinion period, the matter of intercircuit conflicts is quite
223. Memorandum from Judge Alfred T. Goodwin to 9th Circuit Panel (Mar. 9,
1994) (on file with author) and memorandum from Judge Alfred T. Goodwin to 9th
Circuit Panel (Mar. 25, 1999) (on file with author) (regarding Thomas, Head & Griesen
Employees Trust v. Buster, 24 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 1994)).
224. Memorandum from Judge Alfred T. Goodwin to 9th Circuit Panel (Aug. 24,
1993) (on file with author) (regarding United States v. Schram, 9 F.3d 741 (9th Cir.
1993); see also, Ching v. Lewis, 895 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1990).
225. Likewise, in discussion leading to Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516 (9th Cir. 1993),
after Judge Goodwin mentioned to his colleagues that an earlier Ninth Circuit ruling
had "explicitly adopted a Seventh Circuit standard" of a particular case, that out-of-
circuit basis for the Ninth Circuit's position is not again mentioned. Memorandum from
Judge Alfred T. Goodwin to 9th Circuit Panel (Nov. 18, 1992) (on file with author)
(regarding Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516 (9th Cir. 1993).
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likely to be raised, either as part of the request that the panel
reconsider its opinion or in the call for an en banc rehearing.
That may take place even when the judge making the call does
not subsequently dissent from denial of such rehearing.
We first look extensively at several individual cases to see
how, with the panel opinion as the starting point, judges use
cases from other circuits and the possibility of intercircuit
conflict in their exchanges as to whether to rehear a case en
banc. Then we discuss the judges' modes of reacting when faced
with an intercircuit conflict; we end this section with some
observations on judges' use of other circuits' work.
1. Some Individual Cases.
The first case which we examine extensively involved an
appeal by Canadian citizens from a district court ruling
upholding a summons issued by the IRS at the request of
Revenue Canada under the tax treaty, for records held by their
U.S. bank. The majority of the divided panel, concluding that "it
was clear error to find the affidavits [supporting the summons]
made a prima facie showing of legitimate purpose," reversed and
remanded. 226 Early in his opinion, Judge Boochever noted that
one court (the Second Circuit 227) "has suggested that the
international character of treaty requests counsels against
judicial intervention," but ruled the "political question" doctrine
did not apply, so that the court would decide the case. He then
noted that the government had urged the court to adopt the
Second Circuit's position that, when a treaty partner requests a
summons, the "legitimate purpose" notion should not apply.
Distinguishing the Second Circuit case on the grounds that,
after the summons there, Congress had changed the law, 228 the
panel "decline[d] the government's request" and held that "the
good faith doctrine applies to summonses issued under the
treaty."229
Judge Wright raised the issue of intercircuit conflict in his
dissent. He said the panel had created a conflict by rejecting the
Second Circuit position without "sound bases" to do so. The
226. Stuart v. United States, 813 F.2d 243, 250 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'd., United States
v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353 (1989).
227. United States v. Mfrs. & Traders Trust Co., 703 F.2d 47 (2nd Cir. 1983).
228. Interestingly, it did so by adopting the position of the dissenting justices in
United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 437 U.S. 298 (1978).
229. Stuart, 813 F.2d at 249.
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Second Circuit's ruling, he said, was "not undercut by the fact
that TEFRA eliminated the requirement that one requesting
information from the IRS not abandon the civil investigation
intent," "was consistent with current law," and also "shows a
healthy respect for the United States' responsibilities under an
international treaty. "230
Not surprisingly, later discussion within the court of
appeals pivoted on the Second Circuit case and Judge Wright's
dissent became the basis for others' support for rehearing en
banc. Among the reasons offered by one of the panel judges for
such rehearing was that "the majority needlessly creates an
intercircuit split." This judge found "unavailing" the panel
majority's "attempt to distinguish the Second Circuit case by
reference to minor intervening change wrought by TEFRA."231
Responding to a number of his colleagues, the author of the
panel's opinion asserted, "There. .. is no Conflict between the
majority's opinion and the Second Circuit's." This was because
the latter dealt only with a "judicial gloss" on a case with
international ramifications, while here Congress had imposed "a
mandate of the legislature" which courts were not free to ignore
and which the Second Circuit had not had to confront. Given his
conclusion that the case did not create an intercircuit conflict
(nor an intracircuit one, as had also been argued), he said it was
not "of sufficient importance for rehearing en banc." The case did
not in fact receive a requisite vote to be heard en banc.
The second case involved a district judge's sentencing
provision that a defendant, a state trooper found guilty of rape
and murder, was not eligible for parole for 30 years. The panel
majority affirmed, but Judge Norris disagreed about the
limitation on parole eligibility. He claimed that the majority,
instead of following Congress' intent, had followed a Tenth
Circuit case which "did not interpret section 4205; it amended
it."232 Illustrating that off-panel judges often draw on a panel
dissenter's views in calling for en banc rehearing, one judge
made such a call, saying "Judge Norris's partial dissent makes
230. Id. at 253 (Wright, J., dissenting).
231. Agreeing with Judge Wright, Judge Goodwin's law clerk wrote that "[Tihe
majority attempts, vainly, to distinguish this case from a 2nd Cir. case coming down the
other way. We're creating an intercircuit conflict for no good reason." Memorandum
from Miriam Reed to Judge Alfred T. Goodwin (May 19, 1987) (on file with author).
232. United States v. Gwaltney, 790 F.2d 1378, 1393 (9th Cir. 1986) (Norris, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part). See United States v. O'Driscoll, 761 F.2d 589
(10th Cir. 1985).
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the point better than I could."
During the extended debate within the court on whether to
go en banc, another judge, also referring to "Judge Norris'
powerful dissent," argued against an en banc rehearing by
pointing out that both the Eighth and Tenth Circuits had
reached the same conclusion on the issue at hand, while "[n]o
court appears to have reached the contrary result." With
"[fIorceful dissents" in both the Ninth and Eighth Circuits, this
judge thought the Supreme Court, if it "wishes to consider the
issue,.... certainly has enough grist for the mill," so he didn't
"think much would be added to the debate by generating a
circuit conflict." That would happen were the Ninth Circuit to
rehear the case en banc and to adopt Judge Norris's position.
Responding, Judge Norris commented that the recent
Eighth Circuit case agreed with both the Tenth Circuit case and
Ninth Circuit panel majority, which he conceded all on the panel
had missed. Turning to the dissent by the Eighth Circuit's chief
judge agreeing with his own interpretation of the statute, he
quoted from that opinion at length. He recognized that an en
banc court might "ultimately agree with the Lay and Norris
dissents, thereby creating a conflict in the circuits. But that is
not a sin," he said. He also called attention to an earlier case 233
in which, during consideration of whether to take the case en
banc, a judge had been critical of "the supposed vice of
unnecessarily creating a conflict in the circuits;" there where,
despite the creation of a conflict with several other circuits, the
Supreme Court had affirmed the Ninth Circuit ruling.
Continuing debate over whether to rehear the case
contained further discussion of whether the other circuits were
correct and references to the dissents there. Judge Norris could
not find a case adopting the interpretation of the relevant
legislation advocated by his adversary on the court; he thought a
Supreme Court ruling,234 an earlier Ninth Circuit decision, and
an Eighth Circuit case were "to the contrary," with the Ninth
Circuit panel majority, the Tenth Circuit, and the more recent
Eighth Circuit case "unsound innovations that find little support
in statutory language, legislative history, or common sense."
Responding, the other judge was "not sure what Judge Norris
finds . .. supporting his view" in those cases and found three
233. Paulsen v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1983), affd, 469 U.S. 131
(1985).
234. United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178 (1979).
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the Consumer Product Safety Act" and quoted from it at two
places, saying at one of them that "Our reading of the statute
comports with that of the Fourth Circuit."214 Later, another
member of the panel noted that the response to the petition for
rehearing found the Fourth Circuit case and a cited Supreme
Court case to be "directly analogous and 'on all fours' to the
instant case" but noted that the former did not apply the
Administrative Procedures Act, which petitioner felt should be
addressed.
Potential dissenters may also turn to other circuits for case
law favoring their position. Thus, the judge who was to dissent
from the majority's interpretation of the firearms statute in a
case on enhanced penalties for multiple convictions from the
same indictment, pointed for support to a Tenth Circuit en banc
ruling on the subject.215 In a later memorandum supporting the
dissenter's position, an off-panel judge pointed to the same case,
saying, "You will see that the interpretation that [the judge] and
I, and seven judges of the Tenth Circuit, believe to be a plausible
one is indeed a plausible one." That communication from an off-
panel judge prompted the author "to reexamine our opinion."
However, having done so, he wished to retain the same result,
but on the basis of the view propounded by another circuit.
As this suggests, when cases from more than one circuit are
available for use, one may be chosen over the other based on its
rationale. Thus, a conference memo in a RICO drug case216 noted
that on one of the issues, one of the judges "prefers the Tenth
Circuit's point of view ... rather than the Second's." In the
opinion in this case, a footnote indicated that the issue need not
be addressed;21 7 both cases were cited,218 while the panel relied
on the Third Circuit's position on another issue.21 9
While judges most often turn to other circuits' majority
opinions, they are also attracted to dissents elsewhere. However,
they may shy away from choosing between the competing
positions in other courts, as when Judge Goodwin observed that
214. X-Tra Art v. Consumer Product Safety Com., 969 F.2d 793, 795-796 (9th Cir.
1992); see also United States v. Articles of Hazardous Substance, 588 F.2d 39 (4th Cir.
1978).
215. United States v. Neal, 976 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1992).
216. United States v. Saccoccia, 18 F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 1994).
217. Id. at 799, n. 3.
218. United States v. McCormick, 992 F.2d 437 (2nd Cir. 1993); United States v.
Koonce, 945 F.2d 1145 (10th Cir. 1991).
219. United States v. Esposito, 912 F.2d 60, 65 (3nd Cir. 1990).
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he "hesitate[d] to get involved in the D.C. Circuit's debate" on
whether a statute provided for a cause of action. He added,
moreover, that getting involved in that debate was also
unnecessary to resolve the Ninth Circuit's case.220
Any such qualms did not seem to affect the judges in the
Catholic Social Services immigration case, however. In
developing the majority opinion, the author found that Chief
Judge Patricia Wald of the D.C. Circuit had written a dissent
which "effectively refutes" the majority opinion to which she was
responding; the other panel members and judges from another
panel agreed with this view.221  The author, however, did
exercise some caution when he told his colleagues that his
opinion would hold that the courts had jurisdiction; he wanted to
check with them on that point because "this is a threshold issue
and we would be disagreeing with the D.C. Circuit." Here one
sees acknowledgment that a conflict with other circuits will be
created with a choice being made to do so.
Likewise, a Tenth Circuit judge, using that circuit's opinion-
circulation procedures, informed not only fellow panel members
but all the court's judges that "the result reached in this
proposed opinion splits us from the Third Circuit." The panel
adhered to this position, but not before Judge Goodwin (sitting
by designation) suggested in his concurrence to the proposed
opinion "that we deal directly with the [Third and Fourth
Circuit] cases that appear to go against us" 222 - an illustration of
the felt need to deal seriously with cases that create conflicts.
Disagreement among judges may also arise. Illustrating the
dialogue that can be provoked, a judge's claim in a proposed
dissent that the majority was creating an intercircuit conflict
caused Judge Goodwin, who had already concurred in Judge
Hug's majority opinion, "to want to study the matter further -
220. Memorandum from Judge Alfred T. Goodwin to 9th Circuit Panel (Apr. 5,
1994) (on file with author) (regarding In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467
(9th Cir. 1994)).
221. Catholic Social Services, Inc. v. Thornburg, 956 F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 1992). See
Memorandum from Judge Alfred T. Goodwin to 9th Circuit Panel (Feb. 23, 1990) (on file
with author) (indicating that another panel member also agreed). Judge Goodwin's law
clerk, Mary Rose Alexander, in a memorandum to Judge Goodwin (Sept. 5 1990)(on file
with author) advised the judge that "Judge Wald's dissent appears to have the better
argument on both the legislative history and the plain meaning of the statute," and that
the Wald dissent "compellingly refutes" cases from other circuits "as inconsistent with
Supreme Court jurisprudence".
222. Memorandum from Judge Alfred T. Goodwin to 9th Circuit Panel (Feb. 11,
1994) (on file with author) (regarding Homeland Stores, Inc. v. Resolution Trust Corp.,
17 F.3d 1269 (10th Cir. 1994)).
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revise it further to respond directly to the dissent. When the
dissent is to a denial of rehearing en banc, one would not expect
the panel to respond in public; a concurrence in a denial of en
banc rehearing is extremely rare. As any response from the
panel would have taken place in the intra-court discussion of the
en banc call, one would not expect to see a published response.
One can see this in the lack of response to Judge Norris' dissent
from denial of en banc rehearing in Act Up! /Portland v. Bagley.
He first claimed that the majority "repudiates the settled law of
several circuits, including our own," and then said that the
majority has cited "as the villain" in "inflicting such damage on
the fabric of qualified immunity law" a Supreme Court summary
reversal, which he said cannot bring about change in the law. A
more cynical view for the lack of response is that the calls for
rehearing en banc have been heard regularly, and frequently,
from the same judges, leading to a "Cry Wolf' reaction.
Even when dealing directly with cases raised by the
dissenter's intercircuit conflict claim, the majority may treat
them much more briefly than does the dissenter. This may be
because the latter, having already failed to persuade panel
colleagues, may be attempting to catch the attention of other
colleagues who monitor slip opinions; here the dissent paves the
way for an en banc call just as a dissenter from the court's
failure to grant en banc rehearing may be seeking to attract the
Supreme Court's attention.
One might expect that, because ofthe importance of an en
banc decision, claims of intercircuit conflict made by dissenters
to an en banc opinion would receive a response. However, even
in those situations, such claims by the dissenter may go
unanswered. This was true with Roy v. Gomez. 167 There the
Ninth Circuit en banc majority held it was not harmless error to
omit, from instructions on aiding and abetting, the requirement
that the jury find that the defendant intended to encourage or
facilitate the principal's offense. Although devoting much of his
discussion to what he believed was the majority's improper
application of Supreme Court opinions, Judge Wallace, in
dissent, added his assertion that the majority had created
intercircuit conflict by refusing to apply one Supreme Court
ruling rather than a Scalia concurrence to which he said it had
improperly looked.168
167. 81 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
168. Id. at 870 (9th Cir. 1996)(en banc) (Wallace, J., concurring and dissenting).
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Another en banc case in which dissenters received no
response also illustrates how intercircuit variation in legal
interpretation can affect financial transactions which reach
across circuit boundaries yet one circuit is face with having to
rule on some aspect of those transactions. A bankruptcy court
had applied the law of its own circuit but a contested transaction
involved in the bankruptcy had taken place in another circuit
which had different law. Claiming an intercircuit conflict,
Judges Thomas and Hawkins complained that the Ninth
Circuit, "[bly imposing our view of how option contracts should
be treated.., on a Fifth Circuit bankruptcy,.. .unnecessarily
intrudes upon the law of another circuit," and had created an
intercircuit conflict with the Fifth Circuit but also "resolved the
conflict by declaring Fifth Circuit authority inapplicable to a
Texas bankruptcy," counter to the demands of "[clomity and
simple respect for our colleagues in another circuit."169 Despite
the strength with which this claim was made, the majority did
not mention the case the dissenters had pressed.
There was also no response from the en banc majority which
ruled on a district court's power to hear a case without
addressing sua sponte whether the appeals court should decline
jurisdiction.170 In addition to criticizing the majority for not
having considered a Seventh Circuit ruling that came after an
earlier Ninth Circuit en banc,171 Judge Alarcon, in dissent, felt
that the majority "creates an intercircuit conflict with those
circuits that have addressed the question whether Brilihart
abstention can be raised sua sponte." His "research ha[d]
revealed," he said, "that every court that has addressed the
question whether an appellate court can raise abstention sua
sponte where the case involves the doctrines of federalism has
answered in the affirmative. " 172 One might have thought that
Judge Alarcon's extensive discussion would have been met by
Judge Wallace thought his colleagues misapplied Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619
(1993), and O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432 (1995), and should not have looked to
Justice Scalia's concurrence in Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263 (1989). The Supreme
Court vacated and remanded with directions, California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2 (1996), the
equivalent of a reversal.
169. In re Robert L. Helms Constr. & Dev. Co., 139 F.2d 702, 707-08 (9th Cir. 1998)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
170. Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220, 1233-34 (9th Cir.
1998) (en banc) (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
171. Meyers v. County of Lake, 30 F.3d 847 (7th Cir. 1994); Acri v. Varian Assocs.,
114 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
172. 133 F.3d at 1223-34 (Alarcon, J., dissenting).
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Ninth Circuit dealt with the district court's designation of a
defendant as a career offender, which depended on whether the
person was "incarcerated" at a certain time. Here the judges
"rejected a Sixth Circuit decision that reached 'the opposite
conclusion." 149 In most cases of this type, the dissenter used the
other circuit's ruling for support. 150 In most cases Lindquist
examined, in which the majority opinion recognized conflict, "the
deviating circuits acknowledged that their decisions would
create a conflict but did not spend extensive time agonizing over
that fact." Nonetheless, it is clear that conflict was created
"knowingly" rather than through ignorance.' 51
An example of such explicit disagreement came in a case
dealing with a statute of limitations question concerning RICO
conspiracy. Here Judge Hall stated clearly why she disagreed
with the Second Circuit's position interpreting a relevant
Supreme Court case and explained the basis for her
disagreement. 52  A slightly more cautiously-stated, but
nonetheless direct, disagreement came in a case where Seventh
Circuit judges, while claiming their "highest regard for our Sixth
Circuit colleagues and the concerns that motivated them to
adopt the Justice Department's view" concerning the stay
provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act," could not agree
that the statutory language "can be pushed this far."153
Dissenters may also part company with other circuit's
doctrine. For example, in responding to a claim that a video
conference sentencing hearing violated the Federal Rules, Fifth
Circuit Judge Henry Politz rejected reliance on a Ninth Circuit
opinion for the proposition such sentencing was prohibited.
Quoting from that opinion, he said, "I appreciate our sister
circuit colleagues' concerns, but decline to accept their
conclusion" because it "fails to recognize" an alternative
meaning of the defendant's "presence."1 54
The presence of a dissent in another circuit's case certainly
provides a basis for departing from the intercircuit consensus. It
149. United States v. Latimer, 991 F.2d 1509, 1515 (9th Cir. 1993).
150. Hellman, supra note 1, at 1077.
151. Lindquist, supra note 16, at 14, 18.
152. Grimmett v. Brown, 75 F.3d 506, 517 (9th Cir. 1996) (dismissed as
improvidently granted, see 519 U.S. 233 (1977)).
153. French v. Duckworth, 178 F.3d 437, 443 (7th Cir. 1999), rev'd and remanded,
see Miller v. French, 120 S.Ct. 2246 (2000)).
154. United States v. Navarro, 169 F.3d 228, 241 (5th Cir. 1999) (Politz, J.,
dissenting).
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gives support to a panel that chooses to create an intercircuit
conflict. Thus, dealing with the question of whether the statute
outlawing movement of firearms in interstate commerce applied
to items that were stolen after they had traveled in interstate
commerce, the Ninth Circuit panel engaged in ritual deference
to another circuit ("While we hesitate to part company"), but
found the Sixth Circuit's dissenting judge's "reasoning more
persuasive" and adopted his position.155  Drawing on a
conflicting circuit's dissenter in this fashion not only serves to
legitimate one's own position but shows that someone within the
conflicting circuit believes that circuit "got it wrong," even if that
is not the specific language used in citing the dissent. Likewise,
a dissenting judge may turn for support to the opinion of a
fellow-dissenter in another circuit.
D. Responses to Dissenters' Claims.
Particularly important are cases in which a dissenter-to
the panel opinion or the denial of rehearing en banc--claims
that the court is, creating an intercircuit conflict. An example is
Judge Graber's claim that the Ninth Circuit majority in United
States v. Fuchs "creates but does not acknowledge a split with
two of our sister circuits" on the issue of plain error as to
omitted jury instructions. 156 Another, in a case concerning
providing aid to a disabled parochial school student, is Judge
Kleinfeld's assertion that several other circuits (and the
Supreme Court) "have all held to the contrary" of the Ninth
Circuit's position with one court doing so "in a case materially
identical to this one." Not only was it the case that "[t]he
majority puts us at odds with three other circuits to have
considered analogous issues," but also "[t]he majority fails to
adequately distinguish" the rulings of the other courts of
appeals. 15 7
Because of the importance of such claims, we now examine
responses to them. Faced with such claims, how does the
majority respond? Does it do so? And if so, minimally or with
extended discussion? 58 The claims made in a dissenting opinion
155. United States v. Cruz, 50 F.3d 714, 716 (9th Cir. 1995).
156. 218 F.3d 957, 967, 969-970 (9th Cir. 2000) (Graber, J., dissenting). Judge
Graber's claim of intercircuit inconsistency was joined with a number of other claimed
errors in the majority's position. Id., at 967.
157. KDM ex rel. WJM v. Reedsport Sch. Dist., 196 F.3d 1046, 1052-53, 1055 (9th
Cir. 1999)(Kleinfeld, J.,dissenting).
158. See Hellman, supra note 1, at 1065-75.
164 Vol. 63
58
Montana Law Review, Vol. 63 [2002], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol63/iss1/4
INTERCIRCUIT CONFLICTS
bankruptcy court but the district court that had awarded the
fees.' 06 In another instance, a panel dealt with whether the so-
called "cause and prejudice" requirement was to be applied when
a defendant challenged his guilty plea. The judges first noted
"that a conflict exists in the circuits" and then observed that
Ninth Circuit cases "appear to be more consistent with the
answers reached by the Second and Third Circuits" than the
Seventh Circuit." However, the court still managed to sidestep
resolution of the conflict because, said the court, that
requirement did not prevent review of a defendant's
jurisdictional claim. 10 7
The stance of acknowledging-without-resolving does not
mean the court will not later revisit the conflict issue and
resolve it. One can see this with respect to the question of
whether bankruptcy courts had jurisdiction to award attorney's
fees. The Ninth Circuit first noted that "[e]xistence of both an
intra- and inter-circuit split was previously recognized by this
Circuit" in a ruling which "did not address the issue." Then,
providing an extensive discussion and giving six reasons, the
court adopted the Fourth Circuit's view and rejected that of the
Eleventh Circuit. 08 In a 1999 case, the panel noted that the
court had earlier "noted a conflict among the other circuits on
[the] question of whether, under the provision of Rule 60(b) that
a judge may vacate a judgment "on motion," there must be a
motion from a party or whether the judge may do so sua sponte,
but that the court "did not resolve" it. Now, however, the court
would "conclude that the Fourth and Fifth Circuit position"
allowing a judge to act on his or her own "makes better practical
sense."109
106. In re Cascade Roads, 34 F.3d 756, 767 n.12 (9th Cir. 1994).
107. Chambers v. United States, 22 F.3d 939, 945 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc). The
court even added, in a note, 'Our analysis has been consistent with the approach the
Second Circuit took." Id., at 945 n. 11. In a later case, the court cited to Chambers as
having noted an intercircuit conflict but not resolved it. See Gonzalez v. United States,
33 F.3d 1047, 1949 (9th Cir. 1994). See also Benjamin v. Jacobson, 172 F.3d 144, 188
n.28 (2nd Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Calabresi, J., concurring). Second Circuit Judge Guido
Calabresi, in a separate concurring opinion, suggested that a disagreement between the
circuits was one between "conflicting obiters" and thus his court should not decide the
issue until it was fully presented. Id. at 188 n.28.
108. In re Yochum, 89 F.3d 661, 666 n.3 (9th Cir. 1996).
109. Kingvision Pay-Per-View v. Lake Alice Bar, 168 F.3d 347 (9th Cir. 1999); the
earlier case noted was Clifton v. Att'y Gen. of Cal., 997 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1993).
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3. Resolved Conflicts.
Related to responding to a claim of conflict by saying there
is none, because cases can be distinguished, is to say that the
conflict has been resolved. Here judges acknowledge that an
intercircuit conflict exists but go on to argue that an intervening
Supreme Court ruling has disposed of it. For example, in Chan
v. Society Expeditions,110 the Ninth Circuit noted the Supreme
Court's resolution of a conflict in Conrail v. Gottschall."'
Because the Supreme Court takes some cases to resolve
intercircuit conflicts, it is not surprising that courts of appeals
judges talk of whether the justices have resolved such conflicts,
even if such mention at times seems to be fairly routine.
Even when the justices do not rule directly on an
intercircuit conflict, one of their decisions addressing an issue on
which several courts of appeals have ruled prompts attention
because it affects the work of those courts of appeals which then
come to the issue. Thus, in a case on whether liquidated
damages under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) were excludable from taxable income, the Ninth Circuit
panel first indicated that "[u]ntil recently" the case law had
"firmly established." It then noted that this prior analysis was
changed by a Supreme Court ruling, although the author
observed that courts had continued to reach the same result
"even under the Supreme Court's more restrictive test."112
Congress' resolution of intercircuit conflicts is also
mentioned from time to time. In one such instance, the Ninth
Circuit, sitting en banc to review the criminal conviction of
Judge Robert Aguilar, noted that Congress had obviated a
conflict the Ninth Circuit had earlier created with the Second
Circuit over the witness-tampering statute "by amending section
1512 to cover specifically non-coercive witness tampering." As
Judge Hug observed for the court, "in removing the conflict...,
Congress indicated what type of noncoercive conduct was meant
to be proscribed. .. 113 In another case, after noting that there
110. Chan v. Soc'y Expeditions, 39 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994).
111. Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottschall, 512 U.S. 532 (1994).
112. See Schmitz v. Commissioner, 34 F.3d 790, 792-793 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding
back pay and liquidated damages excludable from gross income). The Supreme Court
case is United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
113. United States v. Aguilar, 21 F.3d 1475, 1485 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd en banc. The
earlier Ninth Circuit case was United States v. Lester, 749 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1984) (in
conflict with United States v. Hernandez, 730 F.2d 895 (2nd Cir. 1984)). See also the
discussion of this conflict, and of the resolution by Congress, in the subsequently-vacated
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had been intercircuit conflict over the application of Rule 35(a)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Ninth Circuit
held that as a result of Congress' amendment of the Rule, "it is
now clear that a district court is divested of jurisdiction once a
notice of appeal has been filed from the original sentence."114
Congress is not the only non-judicial policy-making body
providing resolution of intercircuit conflicts that the courts then
mention in passing. The courts have noted the U.S. Sentencing
Commission's resolution of some conflicts when it amends the
Sentencing Guidelines. 1 5
Court of appeals judges have a particular interest in
instances in which a Supreme Court ruling has undercut the
cases which have created a circuit split, as this eases the task of
those courts of appeals which might otherwise have to choose
one position over another. For example, a district court relied on
a Third Circuit case but the Supreme Court resolved a conflict
between the Third and Fourth Circuits and impliedly overruled
the Third Circuit case. As a result, the Ninth Circuit felt
required to reverse the district court. 1 6 A case on sentencing for
conspiracy also illustrates this point. Judge Goodwin noted that
the defendant "points to an apparent conflict among circuits"
and an earlier Ninth Circuit case supposedly supporting her
position, and cases from other circuits "which she contends
support [its] logic." However, he said, "recent Supreme Court
precedent appears to defeat" defendant's argument, with the
Edwards v. United States "holding undercut[ting] the vitality" of
the cases on which defendant had relied.117
Supreme Court resolution of an intercircuit conflict is
particularly likely to receive attention by the court whose earlier
panel opinion, United States v. Aguilar, 994 F.2d 609, 639 (9th Cir. 1993).
114. United States v. Ortega-Lopez, 988 F.2d 70, 72 (9th Cir. 1993). The Federal
Rules are developed by the Judicial Conference of the United States, promulgated by the
Supreme Court, and go into effect if Congress does not disturb them. Thus, one could
argue that the judiciary, although not the Supreme Court itself, had been the prime
actor resolving this intercircuit conflict.
115. See the acknowledgment of Amendment 484, which "addresses an inter-circuit
conflict regarding the meaning of the term 'mixture or substance'" in Section 2D1.1 of the
Guidelines. U.S.S.G.App.C, Amend. 84, referred to in United States v. Innie, 77 F.3d
1207, 1209 (9th Cir. 1996), and United States v. Millican, 68 F.3d 482 (9th Cir.
1995)(Table), 1195 WL 623436.
116. Saari v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 968 F.2d 877, 879 (9th Cir. 1992);
see also Nicholson v. CPC Int'l Inc., 899 F.2d 221 (3rd Cir. 1989); and Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195 (4th Cir.1990), affd, 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
117. United States v. Jackson, 167 F.3d 1280, 1284-1285 (9th Cir. 1999); see
Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511 (1998).
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disposition the justices considered. We see this in the Ninth
Circuit's mention in Wilson v. Drake that the Supreme Court
had resolved an intercircuit conflict in reversing one of the court
of appeals rulings in United States v. Smith.118 There was also
a mention in a subsequent immigration case of the Supreme
Court's resolution of a conflict that the Ninth Circuit had
created with the D.C. Circuit.1 9
At times the Ninth Circuit's reference to Supreme Court
action on intercircuit conflicts occurs when its position has been
vindicated, as when, after the Supreme Court affirmed the
Ninth Circuit in Hallstrom v. Tillamook County,120 the Ninth
Circuit applied that ruling to Clean Water Act regulations.' 2'
However, Ninth Circuit judges are particularly likely to
comment on Supreme Court action when the justices have dealt
adversely with a position taken by the Ninth Circuit itself. In a
sentencing case where the Supreme Court had undercut the
Ninth Circuit, Judge Rea (of the Central District of California,
sitting by designation) observed that United States v. Niven, 22 a
Ninth Circuit ruling on concurrent or consecutive sentences for
aggregate losses from separate offenses, had "been criticized by
at least one other circuit" and a "number of circuits... have not
adopted the Niven rationale." He then observed "that the law
has undergone a significant change since our decision in Niven,"
with "the precedential force of our holding in Niven ... severely
undercut, if not eliminated, by the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Witte v. United States," which resolved the
intercircuit conflict, as well as by post-Witte Ninth Circuit
decisions. 23
118. Wilson v. Drake, 87 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Smith,
499 U.S. 160 (1991)).
119. See Naranjo-Aguilera v. I.N.S., 30 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1994), referring to
Catholic Social Services v. Thornburgh, 956 F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 1992) and Ayuda v.
Thornburgh, 948 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1991), resolved by Reno v. Catholic Social Services,
509 U.S. 43 (1993).
120. 493 U.S. 20 (1989) (60-day notice requirement mandatory).
121. Washington Trout v. McCain Foods, 45 F.3d 1351 (9th Cir. 1995).
122. 952 F.2d 289 (9th Cir. 1991).
123. United States v. Scarano, 76 F.3d 1471, 1474-1475 (9th Cir. 1996). See Witte v.
United States, 515 U.S. 389 (1995).
In another sentencing case, as to whether a convicted defendant was entitled to
credit against his sentence for pretrial time spent in a community treatment center, the
Ninth Circuit position that such credit should be granted had been "in conflict with those
of other circuits." A later panel so observed in noting that the Supreme Court "granted
certiorari on a Third Circuit case.., in order to resolve this circuit split" and had then
held the time was not in "official detention" and so credit for it should not be received.
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United States Army, when the judges observed, "We are unable
to avoid an intercircuit conflict, because the Sixth Circuit has
rejected the First Circuit's position."130
Despite the apparent need to choose, the court may still be
able to avoid doing so. It did so, for example, in a case on
exclusion of a defendant's confession because of deliberate delay
between arrest and arraignment. The Ninth Circuit noted it
had "never expressly chosen between an approach that requires
suppression of non-safe harbor confessions if the court
determines the delay to have been unreasonable (McNabb-
Mallory) and an approach that allows admission of some non-
safe harbor confessions given during an unreasonable delay in
arraignment if the court believes that, on balance, suppression
is not warranted," but the panel found that either way the
confession should be excluded. However, it reached this result
only after extensive discussion of other circuits' competing
positions and after coming close to choosing between the
standards when it observed that "most of our cases are more
consistent with the Seventh Circuit balancing test than with the
Second Circuit McNabb-Mallory bright line approach.'
131
When an intercircuit conflict cannot be finessed in some
way, a court must choose one competing position over another.
However, the presence of even one court on each side provides
the panel with material to support either position. 132 When faced
with another question which the Ninth Circuit had not
previously addressed-"whether the Coast Guard has 'exercised'
statutory authority over the 'working conditions' on board
uninspected vessels"-a panel said it "must turn to sources
outside of our circuit law to answer the question." Yet, when it
found that one circuit went one way, two the other, with another
"less clear," it had to choose. The outcome was that "[w]e agree
with the Secretary, the Commission and the Second and
Eleventh Circuits" that the Secretary had the requisite
authority and providing a reason for not adopting the reasoning
130. 125 F.3d 1296, 1302 (9th Cir. 1997). In the same case, the court rejected the
Army's claim that a certain construction "would set up an intercircuit conflict with a
Fifth Circuit case," explaining why the claim was "incorrect." Id. at 1301.
131. United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 975 F.2d 1396, 1396-1404 (9th Cir. 1992).
132. For an instance of a dissenting judge agreeing that "[t]he creation of a conflict
is justified" while disagreeing with colleagues over the majority's invalidation of the
statutory provision at issue because a Sixth Circuit judge's separate opinion properly
found the relevant statute constitutional. See French v. Duckworth, 178 F.3d 437, 448
(7th Cir. 1999) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
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of two other circuits. 133
When a conflict exists and more courts of appeals have
adopted one of the competing positions, there may be a pull from
the majority position. This is like the situation discussed earlier
in which a court, rather than creating a conflict, goes along with
circuits that had already decided an issue. At times, the court
simply notes that its own view is "in accord with the majority
view" 134 or that its caselaw "has been adopted by most of the
circuits that have addressed the issue. ' 135 In deciding to follow
the prevailing view, the judges may nonetheless take the time to
demonstrate the weakness of the minority position. A Tenth
Circuit majority did this when it criticized the one circuit that
had adopted a higher standard than "reasonable belief' as to
whether a prospective arrestee lived in a residence, saying the
Ninth Circuit "provided no rationale for adopting" its
standard. 136
5. Creating a Conflict.
If joining one side or the other in a pre-existing conflict is
not easy, creating a conflict (being the "bad guy") is far more
difficult. Yet at times court of appeals judges are willing to "take
the bull by the horns," they do so because they believe their
position "is the better one." As a Ninth Circuit judge, who said,
"I never felt intercircuit conflict should be avoided," observed
recently, "If three conscientious judges after full consideration
decide that if the rule from another circuit is not a good rule for
the Ninth Circuit, they have their own duty and intellectual
responsibility to decide the case."1 37
Judges are often quite direct in acknowledging that they are
133. Herman v. Tidewater Pacific, Inc., 160 F.3d 1239, 1245 (9th Cir. 1998). This
case also contained an instance of an acknowledgment that the court was creating a
circuit split on another, subsidiary question - whether "the waters at issue here are
within the boundaries of Alaska." Id., at 1243. For another example, where a court
"respectfully disagree[d] with one circuit's position" and "instead align[ed] with another
circuit," see Drew v. United States, 217 F.3d 193, 202-203 (4th Cir. 2000).
134. United States v. One Toshiba Color Television, 213 F.3d 147, 156 (3rd Cir.
2000)(en banc) ("The majority of courts of appeals to consider the fate of a prior forfeiture
proceeding that violated notice requirements agree that a judgment issued without
proper notice to a potential claimant is void.").
135. United States v. Gandia-Maysonet, 227 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2000) (standard in
Rule 11 cases; also noting agreement with Rules and advisory committee notes).
136. Valdez v. McPheeters, 172 F.3d 1220, 1224-25 (10th Cir. 1999). The court also
noted, "The actual status of law in the Ninth Circuit is open to question." Id. at 1225 n. 1.
137. Interview with Senior Judge Alfred T. Goodwin, Pasadena, Cal. (Jan. 25 2000).
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cases (from the Tenth Circuit, the more recent Eighth Circuit
case, and the panel majority) "reaching the same result semi-
independently." The last communication before the vote on
rehearing en banc (which did not succeed) pointed to "a series of
judicial and administrative pronouncements" which shared
Judge Norris's view of the statute. It concluded, "Most recently,
Chief Judge Lay or the Eighth Circuit and Judge Posner of the
Seventh Circuit have explicitly stated the apparent purpose of
§4205 'is to allow release on parole before the earliest date
allowed by subsection (a).'"
A somewhat later case, Federal Labor Relations Authority v.
U.S. Department of the Navy,235 illustrates extensive use of other
circuits' rulings and the effect of action by the Supreme Court
during the pendency of a case. Under federal labor law and the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), a divided Ninth Circuit
panel had enforced a Federal Labor Relations Authority order
that government employees' home addresses should be revealed.
After a petition for rehearing which claimed an intercircuit
conflict, two off-panel judges who were members of another
panel with a similar issue "stopped the clock." They argued that
the panel majority had misapplied the FOIA as recently
interpreted by the Supreme Court and that the majority was
also in conflict with a Second Circuit decision which had
"intelligently disposed" of an argument made by the Ninth
Circuit panel.
The panel majority responded to explain that "the split
existed before our decision was filed," with "divided panels and
en banc reconsiderations .... common" on the issue." Thus, they
argued, taking the case en banc "will not create national
uniformity," something "[o]nly the Supreme Court or Congress
can do... now," with it "likely that the Supreme Court will
grant certiorari in one or more of the cases," which they said "it
certainly should." In their extensive discussion of the merits, the
two judges noted their agreement with the Third Circuit's en
banc opinion on the subject.
A judge who had earlier called for en banc reconsideration
was "not convinced that a circuit split currently exists" and thus
did "not find.., persuasive" the argument that en banc
rehearing would not create national uniformity. This judge
found the Third Circuit case on which the panel majority had
relied to be based on a different FOIA exemption from the one
235. 958 F.2d 1490 (9th Cir. 1992).
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used in the current case, so "there is currently uniformity on the
issue of disclosure of federal employees' mailing addresses."
Arguing that the possibility of Supreme Court consideration
should not preclude further court of appeals examination of the
issue, the judge said not taking this case en banc "will disrupt
this uniformity" and "will result in a split within this circuit and
among all the circuits."236 This memorandum resulted in a
further response from the majority. While acknowledging what
had taken place in the Third Circuit, they noted agreement with
their position by the Fifth Circuit -a decision they examined
extensively, quoting from it at length- and indicated that
several other circuits had the issue at various stages of
consideration, with a Fourth Circuit en banc opinion to be
issued.
Another judge, who had also made an en banc call in this
case, provided additional consideration of the Fifth Circuit case.
He felt it was "most useful because it serves both to sharpen and
narrow the points of disagreement" he had with the position
taken by the panel opinion's author. He drew heavily on that
case in a comparison with the panel opinion, and he argued that
the Ninth Circuit's ruling should be based on it. He also argued
that the multi-factor test used by the Ninth Circuit "should be
replaced by the approach followed in the Second, Seventh, and
D.C. Circuits."
Prompted by this analysis, some time later the panel author
agreed that "the Fifth Circuit analysis is principled and
completely sustainable and one that I could embrace," which
would allow avoidance of the problems the judge's colleagues
had raised. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to the Fifth Circuit case, and, after some intracourt
communication, the decision was made to await the Supreme
Court's ruling. "Ultimately," argued the author of the panel
opinion, "the Supreme Court's guidance will resolve the issue for
the many cases which have been litigated in every circuit in the
country," but withdrawing the panel's already-filed opinion was
said to be "inappropriate because the Fifth Circuit relied, to
some extent, on our opinion in its decision." (The Supreme
Court, ruling that the names and addresses should not be made
available, reversed the Fifth Circuit's ruling.)237
236. 'Moreover, even if the Supreme Court does grant certiorari, this should not
prevent us from giving this issue the type of consideration that it deserves and that the
other circuits have afforded it."
237. See U.S. Dep't of Defense v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487 (1994).
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In a case dealing with whether an incarcerated prisoner
who had committed an offense leading to deportation was
entitled to a prompt deportation hearing, discussion of other
circuits' cases also included exchanges both within the panel and
throughout the larger court. Although deciding that the alien
had stated statutory causes of action, the panel itself was
initially unsure of the direction to take. Both before and after
requested supplementary briefing, it was "inclined to follow the
Eighth Circuit" and "tentatively inclined to affirm on the basis
of the 8th Circuit's holding" that the Immigration and
Naturalization Service could not be required to hold such
hearings on an alien's request. However, on the basis of other
statutes, the majority upheld the alien's claim. 238 This led Judge
Rymer, citing the Eighth Circuit case without suggesting an
intercircuit conflict, to dissent on the ground that the
immigration statute was intended to benefit federal prisoners.
The government's suggestion for rehearing en banc claimed
conflict with both the Seventh and Eighth Circuits. The
majority responded that they had not decided on an implied
right of action (the possible basis for an intercircuit conflict) but
instead had used a statutory basis "consistent with Eighth
Circuit precedent in an analogous situation." That did not
satisfy an off-panel judge who first asked the panel to reconsider
its opinion and then called for en banc rehearing. Asserting an
intercircuit conflict, that judge said, "the result conflicts with
decisions of four other circuits;" those courts "unanimously
agreed" of the relevant statute and none had "allowed an
incarcerated alien to maintain such an action." The judge did
concede, however, "that none of these conflicting decisions
explicitly addressed the issue of standing under the APA or the
Mandamus Act," on which the panel majority had relied.
The response reiterated the assertion that there was no
conflict with other circuits. However, the judges also argued
that the case was not worthy of en banc rehearing, and that the
Supreme Court could take the case if it felt the panel had
misinterpreted its recent rulings on standing under the APA.
The off-panel judge then further urged a positive vote on
rehearing en banc. That led the panel author to assert that the
238. Soler v. Scott, 942 F.2d 597, 606 (9th Cir. 1991). One judge's clerk had
recommended reversing the district court's judgment for the INS, the position ultimately
adopted, but Judge Goodwin's law clerk, finding the Eighth Circuit's "reading... is
sound," had recommended affirmance. Memorandum from Ira Daves to Judge Alfred T.
Goodwin (Sep. 25, 1990) (on file with author).
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opinion in the case, which did involve "interesting legal
questions upon which reasonable judges could differ," "does not
conflict with any decision in any other circuit .... does not
conflict with any decision from this circuit .... [and] is based
upon a reasonable reading of current Supreme Court precedent."
Thus, en banc rehearing was not warranted. (After en banc
rehearing was voted down, the case went to the Supreme Court,
which granted certiorari, vacated, and remanded with directions
to dismiss as moot.)239
Still another case further illustrates the situation in which
there is no public evidence that a possible conflict was
examined, but where intercircuit conflict has been raised only
after the panel has issued its opinion, and, with an off-panel
judge involved, the matter is examined and the opinion stands.
The case, under the Sentencing Guidelines, concerned the time
from which a term of supervised release should be measured.240
After receiving the government's PFR, the panel author
suggested that, "because there is an apparent conflict between
our opinion and the Eighth Circuit, we call for a response to the
petition."241 Another member of the panel, while saying, "I am
not sure there is a conflict with the Eighth Circuit because the
issues were presented differently," nonetheless agreed that a
response should be obtained. After the response was filed, he
continued in that view: "I don't think there is a true conflict with
the Eighth Circuit."
At this point, with the panel having denied rehearing, an
off-panel judge "stopped the clock" to inquire, "before the
mandate issues, whether the panel has considered the conflict
its opinion seems to create with the Eighth Circuit." The panel
author responded, assuring his colleague "that the panel
carefully considered the Eighth Circuit's decision and made a
studied and calculated decision to reject it. ' 242 The off-panel
judge responded, indicating his understanding why the case did
not appear in the panel's opinion; it was, after all, "decided just
weeks before our opinion issued;" however, he argued that the
government "persuasively points out the conflict." He now
wished to know "and I suspect future defendants in analogous
239. Sivley v. Soler, 506 U.S. 969 (1993).
240. United States v. Blake, 88 F.3d 824 (9th Cir. 1996).
241. Memorandum from Judge Alfred T. Goodwin to 9th Circuit Panel (Aug. 26,
1996) (on file with author).
242. Memorandum from Judge Alfred T. Goodwin to Active 9th Circuit Judges (Oct.
25 1996) (on file with author).
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situations may like to know" whether the panel had found the
Eighth Circuit ruling "distinguishable, or just flat out rejected
[its] analysis of the legal issue." He also raised the question of
whether litigants should know the panel's basis for rejecting the
out-of-circuit ruling. The author's response to the off-panel
judges and the remainder of the court suggested that the panel
had followed an earlier circuit ruling rather than the Eighth
Circuit.243 Declining to place an explanation of the reasoning in
the opinion, he said, "We have already published our opinion
along with our reasoning in the case. I assume that our
differences with the Eighth Circuit are apparent to all readers."
The off-panel judge then withdrew his stopclock, concluding the
matter.
2. Modes of Reacting.
We now turn to look more specifically at particular aspects
of judges' dealing with other circuits' cases and intercircuit
conflict. At times the judge claiming an intercircuit conflict is a
dissenter on the panel initially deciding the case; perhaps more
frequently, off-panel judges make the claim of intercircuit
conflict. The panel itself may even seek en banc hearing in
connection with a matter implicating intercircuit conflict, as
when a panel made an en banc call because the judges wished to
overrule a part of an earlier case "that is in conflict with our
sister circuits"; that case was heard en banc.
The United States v. DeSantiago-Martinez case, 24
commenting on the standard for a defendant's appropriate
waiver of the right to appeal a sentence, provides an example of
a judge raising the issue of intercircuit conflict in support of
calling for an en banc court subsequent to his dissent from the
panel. Saying that the panel majority's holding "has been
explicitly disapproved of by one of our sister circuits," he
examined the Eleventh Circuit's case on the subject and also
noted the Fourth Circuit's adoption of a rule like that of the
Eleventh Circuit. When the panel majority responded that the
Eleventh Circuit had responded to the panel's earlier, rather
than later amended, opinion which contained additional
information, an off-panel judge insisted "there is an intercircuit
243. "We decided to follow the lead of our own court instead of that of another
circuit on a petition for rehearing." Memorandum from Judge Alfred T. Goodwin to
Associates on 9th Circuit (November 5 1996) (on file with author).
244. United States v. DeSantiago-Martinez, 980 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1992).
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conflict."
United States v. Vea-Gonzales245 is an example of an off-
panel judge claiming intercircuit conflict. That judge felt that
the panel's opinion, with its holding that a defendant sentenced
as a career offender could challenge prior convictions at
sentencing, "puts us at odds with every other circuit which has
considered the [relevant Sentencing Guidelines] amendment."
Joining that judge and recognizing that the Ninth Circuit might
yet be right, a colleague said "If all the other circuits are wrong,
then we should stand our ground," but concluded, "[I]n this case,
they are not wrong." Another example, with the claimant saying
the panel had opted for the "wrong" position, was Reynolds v.
Martin.246 There, in calling for en banc rehearing, a judge said
that the court had once again done just that in applying the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 retroactively, and, "Once again, the
justification for a holding [was] contrary to six other circuits."
(Having failed to persuade his colleagues to go en banc, this
judge and three others dissented from the denial of rehearing en
banc. 247)
In a case on upward departures from the Sentencing
Guidelines, 248 debate within the court about cases from other
circuits began early because the panel circulated its opinion
before filing. The principal problem in the case was one of
intracircuit conflict, but the work of other circuits was
implicated because, as one off-panel judge put, the issue was
said to have "caused problems in other circuits," and the panel
author was said to have relied on a Second Circuit case that had
been undercut by later cases there. The mention of cases from
other circuits continued without mention of "intercircuit conflict"
for over a year until another off-panel judge raised the issue
after the panel had amended its opinion. 249 The amendment,
which noted a conflict with the Second and Tenth Circuits and
rejected the position of those courts, prompted an ultimately
inconclusive dispute over the panel's duty to inform the court of
creation of the conflict, and the panel's amended opinion stood.
245. 968 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1993).
246. 985 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1993).
247. Estate of Reynolds v. Martin, 994 F.2d 690 (9th Cir. 1993)(dissent from denial
of rehearing en banc).
248. United States v. Castro-Cervantes, 911 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1990), amended, 927
F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1991).
249. United States v. Castro-Cervantes, 927 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1991)(amending
911 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1990)).
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Another instance came in a criminal case where the
disputing judge made the panel's treatment of sufficiency of the
evidence his principal concern. In addition to saying that the
panel's action was "inconsistent with the precedents of the
Supreme Court and this court," the judge asserted that "the
panel's maverick approach is inconsistent with that of every
other circuit." He argued, "I see no reason for us to be the first
court to create a circuit split over what until now was thought to
be such a clear-cut rule." The panel responded after another
judge had chimed in by saying "the new standard puts us out of
step with the rest of the country" and there was some further
communication. Saying that "The so-called intra- and inter-
circuit conflicts identified... are based on an extravagant
misinterpretation of our opinion," the panel judges believed that
the off-panel judge's principal concern was his disagreement
with the panel's result; they did not think that warranted en
banc reconsideration. Further discussing the claimed
intercircuit conflicts, they defended their action by saying that
their formulation of the rule "is consistent with the law in all
circuits, and has been explicitly employed in at least one other
circuit." As a result, they said, "Thus, far from ameliorating an
inter-circuit conflict, [the] en banc call, if successful, may well
create one."
Other instances of off-panel judges claiming a circuit split
appear in several of the calls for en banc rehearings by one of
the circuit's more liberal judges. These also serve to illustrate
the relation between intercircuit conflicts, en banc rehearings,
and the Supreme Court; they also illustrate the fact that a judge
may appear to be seeking en banc rehearing not because of
opposition to intercircuit conflict in principle but because of the
results the judge seeks. Among the judge's efforts were a call for
en banc rehearing of two Sentencing Guidelines cases, which he
felt "create a split between our circuit and the only other circuit
to have decided the issue," and his call for review of two
Superfund cases concerning legal fees as part of clean-up costs
because the panel's rulings in both cases 250 "create a circuit
split" with the Eighth and Sixth Circuits. In the latter instance,
the judge called for en banc "in the hopes of sparing the
Supreme Court some unnecessary work... resolving the
250. See United States v. Sanchez, 967 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Harrison-Philpot, 978 F.2d 1520 (9th Cir. 1992).
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conflict with the Sixth and Eighth Circuits."251
This judge could, however, also seek such conflicts out of the
belief that the correct position was the one stated elsewhere.
The Wong Sentencing Guidelines case is one such instance. 25 2
This judge said that the Ninth Circuit ruling "brings the Ninth
Circuit into line with four other circuits, two of which...
decided the issue en banc" so that "I cannot as yet claim a
conflict in the circuits as a reason for taking Wong en banc," the
judge wished to join "a number of impassioned dissents" in those
other cases. He stated that he was "not hesitant to create an
intercircuit conflict," instead of trying to avoid work for the
Supreme Court. Instead, the judge said directly, "Because of the
exceptional importance of this issue, I have no reluctance to put
pressure on the Supreme Court by creating a conflict in the
circuits" because the matter "has 'percolated' in the circuits long
enough [and] it is time for the Supreme Court to resolve it once
and for all." Illustrative of the position that judges of the courts
of appeals have to make choices concerning intercircuit conflicts,
he declared, "the Ninth Circuit should step up to the plate and
take our cuts at playing a leadership role."253
Still another instance of an off-panel judge raising the issue
of an intercircuit conflict came in a case concerning a Christmas
display held by the panel not to be a violation of the
Establishment Clause. 254 Here a judge, drawing on the panel
dissent, contended that the panel majority "creates a split
among the circuits on the question of whether or not the
guarantee of free expression can trump the Establishment
Clause,"as "[t]wo other circuits have addressed this precise
question and have reached the opposite conclusion." Then, in the
middle of the Ninth Circuit's debate over whether to rehear the
case en banc, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
the Lamb's Chapel case. 255 The dissenter believed that case "if
anything, reinforces my dissent." However, the two judges in
the panel majority asserted that the Supreme Court decision
"resolves the inter-circuit conflict that long preceded it" and they
251. Cf. Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 30 F. 3d 1105 (9th Cir. 1993); Stanton
Road Associates v. Lohrey Enterprises, 984 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1993).
252. United States v. Wong, 2 F.3d 927, 929 (9th Cir. 1993).
253. In a footnote, he added, "While I agree that we should generally be cautious
about creating conflicts in the circuits, we should avoid being overly cautious."
254. Kreisner v. San Diego, 988 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1993).
255. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 383
(1993).
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further contradicted the claim by the off-panel judges that the
panel had created a circuit split by saying, "The split by saying
it existed before our decision."
As this last rejoinder indicates, instead of claims that the
panel has created an intercircuit conflict, there are assertions
that the panel has continued such a conflict. In a case on
qualified immunity, a judge claiming an intercircuit conflict said
that in misreading a Supreme Court decision, the panel had
gone against both earlier Ninth Circuit precedent and "the law
of at least seven other circuits." However, he also noted several
circuits that had taken a contrary position. It was to those three
circuits that the panel turned for support in responding.256
There was at least implicit agreement in this last case that
an intercircuit conflict already existed. However, the judges may
dispute whether a split exists or would, or might, be created and
thus should be avoided. In asking the panel to rethink its
opinion in a sentencing guidelines case, 257 a judge stated "there
is already a conflict in the circuits" caused by a Third Circuit
case which "[t]he parties apparently failed to cite to the panel."
With a circuit split already present, the judge argued that the
panel "should amend its opinion and discuss the Third Circuit
case and base its choice between that approach and the Second
Circuit's on the merits of the respective alternatives rather than
upon a no longer applicable need to avoid an already existing
inter-circuit conflict."
In a case on the availability of injunctions in labor cases,
which the court did hear en banc,258 when a judge "stopped the
clock" to tell the panel that its ruling "appears to conflict
squarely with... other circuit courts of appeals," the panel
opinion's author responded both that "The circuit split over this
issue pre-dated our opinion" and that the conflict "aligns the
Ninth Circuit with the majority of other circuits to consider this
issue." And we have already seen discussion of the question of
the existence of an intercircuit conflict arising in the extended
debate over whether to give en banc rehearing in Federal Labor
Relations Authority v. United States Department of the Navy
decision. 259
256. ActUp!/Portland v. Bagley, 971 F.2d 298 (9th Cir. 1992), amended, 988 F.2d
868, 880 (9th Cir. 1993).
257. United States v. Warren, 980 F.2d i300 (9th Cir. 1992).
258. Miller ex rel. NLRB v. California Pac. Medical Ctr., 991 F.2d 536 (9th Cir.
1993), rev'd en banc, 19 F.3d 449 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
259. 958 F.2d 1490 (9th Cir. 1992).
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3. Using Other Circuits' Work
Determining whether an intercircuit conflict exists is, of
course, only preliminary to deciding whether to adhere to the
new position that is alleged to create the conflict or to join the
other circuits' case law. Where there is a preexisting conflict, the
question becomes which available position to adopt; here within-
circuit disagreements are likely to overlay positions that differ
among other courts of appeals. An example of this latter
situation can be found in the Federal Labor Relations Authority
case. Faced with what they claimed was disagreement among
the circuits, the Ninth Circuit panel majority replied to another
panel working on a similar case by drawing on cases from other
courts of appeals, particularly the Third and Fifth Circuits, to
support positions in its own opinion. However, its arguments
were met in turn with claims that the Third Circuit case was
based on a different FOIA exemption and that the proposed
opinion went beyond the Fifth Circuit's ruling.
An instance in which judges suggested that the Ninth
Circuit should adopt the position of other circuits was the
Gaudin case, on whether the materiality of false statements was
a jury question or a matter of law.260 The situation in this case
was somewhat complex because two judges who had signed onto
the panel opinion made the argument that other circuits' law
should be adopted; despite their initial vote, they voted to accept
the parties' en banc suggestion, and who, and after an off-panel
judge's en banc call, argued that "Every other circuit with an
opinion on the issue has disagreed with Valdez," the pre-existing
Ninth Circuit precedent. 261 They also pointed to an important
subsequent Supreme Court ruling on the matter,262 which they
said made Valdez "no longer good law" and which required that
the Gaudin panel ruling be reheard en banc "so that we may
overrule Valdez and bring our law in line with that of every
other circuit, the Court, our own precedent in analogous areas,
and common sense." In fact, the court did grant en banc
rehearing; the en banc court adopted the same position as the
panel, and the Supreme Court granted review and affirmed the
en banc court.263)
260. United States v. Gaudin, 997 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1993).
261. United States v. Valdez, 594 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1979).
262. Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988).
263. United States v. Gaudin, 997 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc), affd, 515
U.S. 506 (1995).
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If judges can urge the adoption of other circuits' positions
they can also argue against using out-of-circuit caselaw. Thus,
when an off-panel judge, alleging the creation of a circuit split,
sought en banc review of two Superfund cases, 264 the author of
the panel's rulings argued to his court colleagues that the
conflict was "unavoidable." This he said was because the ruling
of one circuit was contained in only one paragraph and the
majority was "unable to accept the Eighth Circuit's shallow
analysis of this statutory interpretation."
In another case, an off-panel judge, agreeing with the panel
dissenter, implicitly argued for adoption of the Second Circuit's
position. He said that the majority had created a circuit split
and that its "attempt to distinguish the Second Circuit case by
minor intervening changes" produced by a statute "is
unavailing." The response by the panel opinion's author was
that there was "no conflict between the majority's opinion and
the Second Circuit's" because the Congress had mandated a
change and thus the Ninth Circuit faced a different situation.
And where a Ninth Circuit judge argues for adopting the
position of another circuit's dissenter, by definition the
argument is that the majority position there should not be
adopted. Thus, during the debate on whether the Gwaltney
sentencing case265 should be reheard en banc, the dissenter from
the panel opinion argued for adopting the position of dissenting
Judge Lay in an Eighth Circuit case the panel had missed and
not to adopt the position of the Eighth and Tenth Circuits.
PART VI. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
This article adopts the perspective of judges of the U.S.
courts of appeals rather than a perspective focused on the U.S.
Supreme Court to present an initial picture of how judges of the
U.S. courts of appeals treat cases from other circuits, and
particularly how they deal, or fail to deal, with claimed or actual
intercircuit conflicts; this includes whether they acknowledge
the existence of such conflicts and, if they do, how they confront
them.
Examination of opinions primarily from the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and of communication among the
judges prior to release of opinions demonstrates several things.
264. Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 30 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 1993); Stanton Road
Assoc's v. Lohrey Enterprises, 984 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1993).
265. United States v. Gwaltney, 790 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1986).
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One is that, in the absence of an existing intercircuit conflict,
courts of appeals judges will often go along with existing rulings
on an issue, although at times they are willing to create a
conflict. When an intercircuit conflict is claimed to exist, the
judges respond in several ways. They may do no more than
acknowledge the conflict. However, at times they do more. They
distinguish cases claimed to conflict; they suggest that the
conflict has been displaced by a Supreme Court ruling or
congressional action; and, most directly, they take sides in the
dispute. When a dissenter claims the presence of such a conflict,
the majority at times makes no response. Yet there are
numerous instances in which majority and dissenter, meeting
normative expectations that judges will address each other's
concerns, engage in an explicit discussion of the purported
comments. And there are still other cases containing an implicit
dialogue in which a "conflict" as such is not addressed but both
sides discuss the same cases.
Intercircuit conflicts, real or perceived, are seldom the only
issue in a case, and quite often they are far from being the core
matter under discussion. Most frequently, circuit splits are often
discussed in a case along with intracircuit conflicts and with
conflicts that arise between court of appeals rulings and the
Supreme Court. In short, it appears that seldom does a stop-
clock or en banc call appear to rest on an intercircuit conflict
alone. The varied elements in the mixture include claims that
the panel has misread prior circuit precedent, created a within-
circuit conflict, created an intercircuit conflict, and has decided
a case contrary to ruling Supreme Court precedent. Indeed,
intracircuit conflicts and alleged conflicts with Supreme Court
precedent appear to receive higher levels of priority, and
perhaps more attention, than intercircuit conflicts.
Not only are questions of intercircuit conflict piled atop
claims concerning intracircuit conflict and about tension
between Supreme Court precedent and court of appeals rulings.
At other times, these matters are linked. There is, for example, a
clear linkage between the presence of intercircuit conflict and
taking cases en banc, as some judges feel that intercircuit
conflicts are sufficiently important to make a case "en banc-
worthy." This connection is related to the more general question
of whether a court of appeals should sit en banc to deal with
issues before they go on their way to the Supreme Court or
should avoid expending resources because the cases will to go to
the Supreme Court in any event and will reach the justices
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faster without an en banc hearing. 266 If other circuits have
decided cases in such a way that intercircuit conflict exists and
those cases have been brought to the Supreme Court, the
conflict-with-Supreme Court and intercircuit conflict claims may
be intermixed.
While intercircuit conflict claims may become mixed with
other issues, it is clear from this examination that potential and
actual intercircuit conflicts do receive the attention of the courts
of appeals. They do not either wantonly manufacture them or
pass them on willy-nilly to the Supreme Court. While some
individuals or panels of judges are not faint of heart with respect
to creating such conflicts, for the most part the judges go along
with other circuits' views rather than create conflict, and efforts
are made to minimize the extent of intercircuit conflict.
The picture presented here, while extensive, is nonetheless
preliminary. More attention to the perspective of court of
appeals judges is needed. One could, for example, focus on how
courts of appeals have dealt with the cases the Supreme Court
cites when it grants review to resolve intercircuit conflicts, and
how the justices deal with cases in which intercircuit conflict has
already been discussed.
One could further add to our store of information by using
any specific circuit as the focal point to examine questions like
the following:
(1) How does the Supreme Court treat intercircuit conflict in
those cases where the possibility of a conflict has been raised by
a lower court judge and perhaps debated in that judge's court?
Does the Supreme Court grant review to resolve those conflicts
which have been discussed by the court of appeals?
(2) When the Supreme Court accepts a case from a court of
appeals to resolve an intercircuit conflict, or, while taking
another circuit's case, mentions ruling from the former court,
are the cases the lower court considered when it dealt with a
claim of real or putative intercircuit conflict the same cases the
Supreme Court cites or do the justices refer to cases that the
lower court has not discussed? The latter may be the situation if
there is a lag between the lower court ruling and the granting of
review, or if the court of appeals ruling to which cert is granted
has simply applied earlier circuit precedent where intercircuit
266. This matter is explored in Stephen L. Wasby, The Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals En Bancs, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. (forthcoming), originally presented to the
American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C. (2000).
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differences were discussed. Timing is important. At times, most
or all of the cases creating a purported conflict are decided
within a short span of time and are brought to the Supreme
Court almost simultaneously, 267 while other cases involved in
the conflict are much older, with certiorari having perhaps been
denied in those cases.
(3) Conversely, did the lower court consider the cases the
Supreme Court cited as creating an intercircuit conflict, and, if
so, how did the lower court deal with those cases? How does
that treatment compare with the Supreme Court's treatment?
Whether the lower court did deal with the cases cited by the
justices will be a function of timing-of when those cases were
decided in relation to when the court of appeals being studied
created circuit precedent on the issue.
The data and analysis that such studies would provide
would add immeasurably to our knowledge of the operation of
the federal court system. In particular, it would help redress the
disproportionate attention to how the Supreme Court treats
intercircuit conflicts. More important, it would serve to minimize
the portray of the Supreme Court as always acting on the lower
courts and would better demonstrate the continuing reciprocal
interaction between the courts of appeals and the Supreme
Court.
267. Compare the "cert. pending" status for some cases cited as part of a conflict.
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